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Summary: Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict
This is a summar of a "state-of-the-ars" report entitled Humanitarian
Assistance and Confliet, completed by the Chr. Michelsen Institute for the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1997. The report reviews the
policy-relevant literature on the relationship between humanitarian assistance
and violent conflct, records the principal experiences of Norwegian NGOs,
and indicates areas for further study. A bibliography of references from the
literature is attached.
Key issues
The rapid growth of international aid channeled to "complex humanitarian
emergencies" has led to paralleI calls for preventive action. The question is also
asked how humanitarian assistance and other forms of international civilian
presenee can help to prevent and mitigate violent conflct. A small but
significant literature has emerged in this area - some works art in the tradition
of the social sciences, others in the form of advocacy writings, policy debate,
evaluations and mission reports. This report analyzes the foci of inquiry and the
fin dings in the literature, and, in an original collection of data, also
systematizes the main conclusions of NorwegianNGOs in the relevant issue-
areas by means of structured interviews undertaken for this purpose.
Four key questions are addressed:
. What do we know about how, and why, humanitarian presenee can help to
prevent or limit conflet?
. What are the conditions for failure or success?
. Can hurnanitarian presenee have counterproductive effects by making the
conflct worse?
. How can one control for unintended consequences?
The report does not review the record of humanitarian agencies with respect to
their primar objectives, I.e. to save lIves and reduce suffering in the short run
by providing food and medical assistance. There is a significant literature
which documents the impressive achievements of humanitarian assistance in
this regard, also in contemporary cornplex emergencies (see e.g. Forsythe
1996). But it is precisely this achievement which has given rise to the
additional question of whether the 10ng-term and unintended consequences of
aid may be to keep the conflct alive as well. The issue currently is in the
frontline of the policy debate among humanitarian practitioners as well as
observers, and consequently figures centrally in this report.
It is important to recognize that since conflct is a process, so is prevention.
Preventive action can occur during several phases of a conflct - on the
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upswing, whenthe conflct in theory can get worse, and on the downswing,
when strife in theory may resume. Nor is there a shar conceptual distinction
between mitigation and prevention. Reduced violence (Le. mitigation of the
conflct) is the res ult of some form of prevention if it is reasonable to assume
that violence otherwise would have continued or worsened. For instance, the
creation of pockets of peace or "humanitarian zones" within a theater of
conflict is both mitigative and preventive in this sense, as is negotiated
reduction of strife.
ff the focus is on prevention, methodological reasons inevitably bias the inquiry
in a negative direction. It is easier to study failures than succes ses (since we can
never know precisely what was prevented if preventive measures succeeded).
The literature, moreover, contains very few studies that detail the positive-
preventive impact of humanItarian presence.
Principles and schools of thoughts
The review of the literature, drawn from the social science, and reports and
policy discussions of aid agencies/organizations, suggests four major
conc1usions. All are concerned with humanitarian assistance in "complex
emergencies" where aid actors operate in (or near) a conflct area, and where
violence is man-made but exacerbated by natural conditions. The conclusions
are as follows:
Humanitarian aid cannot be a substitute for political action. The current
conventional wisdom echoes the major findings of the Joint Evaluation of
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (1996). Humanitarian assistance has only a
limited, moderating influence on the political forces and the nature of violence
in the target area. Humanitarian presenee can only buy time for political
solutions, and must be undertaken in tandem with a political and milItary
engagement if the forces driving a conflct are to be dealt wIth. Hence, it is
unrealIstic and counterproductive to assign humanitarian assistance an
ambitious agenda in terms of mitigating existing violence or preventing further
conflct. Not only does this raise false expectations, humanitarian assistance
may become a "fig leat' for political inaction towards the conflct and Its
underlying causes.
Humanitarian assistance has manifold consequences in the conflict area:
negative as well as positive, unintended as well as intended. There is growing
recognition among humanitarian actors and observers that humanItarian
assistance has complex consequences in the target area. There are significant
short-term positive consequences (e.g. saving lives) , but there is increasing
awareness of negative, unintended and indirect consequences in the longer run
such as helping to prolong a conflct, enhancing the vulnerability of
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beneficiaries - e.g. by attracting people to feeding are as that become "kiUer
traps", as the French-based Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) describes the aid
pattern in Ethiopia in 1984 (World in Crisis, 1997) - or by undermining local
coping and long-term strategies. There is growing ariculation of the argument
made by Wiliam Shawcross in his study of Cambodia already in 1984 - The
Quality of Mercy - that aid ageneies have avested interest in channeling relief,
and hence become willng paricipants in the institutional accommodation
which the North is fashioning towards the repeated or permanent emergencies
in the South. In this view., elaborated by the Britishßçholar Mark Duffield in
The Symphony of the Damned (1996), humanitarian aid becomes for the North
a principal mechanism of conflct management in the South.
A guiding principle of humanitarian assistance mus t therefore be minimalist -
"Do No Harm". Mounting concern with the negative effects of humanitarian
assistance has been countered variously. One response is that aid ageneies
operating in conflct areas should adopt the motto: "Do no harm". Articulated
in a 1989 book by US-based experts Mar Anderson and Peter W oodrow,
Rising from the Ashes, the "do no harm" approach has become increasingly
accepted by aid agencies and NGOs. The principle formed the point of
deparure for a major conference of North American-based NGOs and aid
agencies in 1996 that sought to develop concrete strategies of action.
Growing awareness of the complex consequences of humanitarian assistance
has sharpened the division between the "pure humanitarians" and the
"solidarity humanitarians". An old debate has intensified. The "age of
innocence" has passed with the recognition that humanitarian assistance
necessarily has political consequences. However, the "purists " - exemplified by
the Swiss-based International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - argue that
the principle must be to provide neutral and impartial assistance, and that ways
can be devised to reduce the political consequences. The "solidarity" view, on
the other hand - increasingly exemplified by the MSF - maintains that neutrality
is a form of moral bankrptcy, and argues that humanitarian organizations must
take sides in the struggle against injustice and inhumane practices.
Strategies and practices
Humanitarian organizations have shown some reluctance to become involved
in explicit conflct management, as well as forffs of protection such as human
rights monitoring. The reluctance is based on fear that such activity may
undermine their continued presenee in a conflct area and hence jeopardize
their primar mIssion to deliver aid. Nevertheless, insofar as "complex
emergencies" have come to be viewed in the international aid community
generally (and especially in the UN system) as having a human rights
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component, humanitarian NGOs increasingly have moved in this direction as
well. The major Norwegian NGOs have all adopted this approach (see below).
Humanitarian NGOs that work in "war-torn societies" increasingly inc1ude
reconciliation or confidence building dimensions in their projects. Consciously
or not, these NGOs typically base their work on a sociological theory of
integrative cooperation which holds that by working together to achieve a
common aim, preferably a concrete task, the parties wil develop mutual trust
that transcends their conflcting interest. For mariY NGOs involved in
rehabilitation projects, these kinds of projects appear as a natural and relatively
simple extension of their traditional activity. A prototype is multi-ethnic brick-
making in Rwanda to rebuild houses that were destroyed by ethnic violence in
1994, and in the process to rebuild communication across ethnic lines.
Norwegian NGOs have moved rapidly into this area.
Humanitarian NGOs that deliberately take on conflct management/res ol uti on
tasks use three tools:
i) handling of information (overt or "quiet" advocacy, denunciation,
lobbying)
ii) providing good offices to facilitate dialogue, mediate, or conciliate on
the margins of standard aid work
iii) using the power of the resources which they introduce into the conflict
area to extract concessions from the conflcting parties.
The first two are most cornmonly used. As for (iii) , given their position as
providers of very significant resources in situations typified by extreme
scarcities, NGOs have in theory considerable bargaining power. Humanitarian
imperatives limit, however, their willngness to manipulate emergency aid for
political purposes. The major and parial success story in this respect is
Operation Lifeline Sudan, as recounted by a team for the Humanitarianism and
War Project of Brown University (USA) (Minear 1991).
Less dramatic ways to enhance the positive effects of humanitarian presence in
terms of mitigating existing violence, and preventing further conflct, have
been identified by US-based NGOs (Smock 1996). These are:
. Closer dialogue with donors that have limIted field knowledge so as to
avoid unrealistic restrictions and inappropriate mandates on NGOs;
. Improved planning to (i) assess needs more accurately, and (ii) analyze the
consequences of agreements negotiated to gain access to needy populations
and obtain security for NGO personneI;
. Provide aid that wil have the longest-term benefit to targeted groups and
empower local institutions;
. Deploy human rights monitors to help protect local populations from the
fighting factions;
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. Coordinate c10sely with other aid organizations that operate in the same
conflct area;
. Contract for independent monitoring and evaluation of assistance programs
to reduce mismanagement and the diversion of supplies.
In a more targeted strategy, NGOs have identified at least three ways of using
provision of resources in a conflct-preventive manner. ff conflct is a rational
choice in the context of shrinking resources, humanitarian aid can be used to
reshape opportunity structures in desired directionsby:.
. providing alternative channels for conflct-oriented leaders, (ex- )soldiers
and miltia;
. supporting moderating distributive institutions;
. reducing resource scarcities in conflct areas.
A traditional means of mitigating violence in a conflct area is to establish
protected areas. In its classic humanitarian form, this was the Red Cross zone
(hospitals, etc.), protected only by a symbol and, implicitly, by the value of the
services rendered to all paries to the conflct. In the 20th century, non-military
protected areas have developed in various forms. Experience shows that they
are mostly effective when they
. are demilitarized;
. serve the humanItarian needs of bothlall paries to the conflet;
. are established with the consent of the paries concerned.
Protected areas of this kind serve to modify the symptoms of conflct in the
sense that they limit the extent of violence and reduce the suffering of victims.
As such they have a mitigating rather than preventive effect, and do not address
the underlying causes of the conflct.
Human rights monitoring are related to conflct mitigation and prevention in
three ways: a) human rights reporting as an instrument of early warning of
humanItarian crises, b) human rights monitoring as an instrument to deter
abuse against individuals, and c) human rights reporting as an instrument to
trigger stronger policy measureso In addition, human rights education is viewed
as a generalized, indirect but stil important conflct prevention measure.
There is not yet a cumulative literature that assesses these propositions in a
systematie manneL Some studies focus on the design, some on the impact, of
individual human rights operationso Analysis is typically lacking of factors
which may account for success or failure across operations - the level of
violence, consent of the government, the numbers and professionalism of the
monitors, etco Two major NGOs - Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch - have analyzed the effectiveness of human rights reporting in recent UN
operations. Amnesty (1994) concluded that UN human rights observers in El
Salvador and Cambodia had significant mitigative and deterring effects,
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resultng in the release of detainees and the improvement of prison conditions.
They also made important contributions to the legislativeand institutional
reform of the legal order, and raised public awareness of human rights issues.
In the UN operations in Somalia, northern Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia,
Human Rights Watch (1993) found that the human rights monitoring
component was given less emphasis. In Rwanda, the initial monitoring
operation was criticized for lack of professionalism and effectiveness (Joint
Evaluation 1996).
Experiences of Norwegian NGOs
Given the limited written literature on the subject, this report also sought to
systematize some aspects of the experience of Norwegian NGOs. NGO
representatives were asked to draw on their organizational experience to assess
the potential impact of various forms of humanitarian presence on concrete
conflict situations that fell in the category of complex humanItarian
emergencies. The following organizations were interviewed: the Norwegian
Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM) which is
primarily engaged in democracy or peace bu ilding activities, 
1 and the five
principal humanitarian NGOs: the Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) , the
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), the Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), the
Norwegian Save the Children (NSC), and the Norwegian Refugee Council
(NRC).
In general, the NGOs are primarily concerned with the problems of i) how to
delIver assistance, ii) how to protect civilans, and possibly as a spin-off effect
iii) how to prevent further conflct. The dual cha1lenge of managing conflct
and providing aid has increasingly come ioto focus in the international
community, and is also par of an ongoing debate among the Norwegian
humanitarian NGOs.
Human rights monitoring
Human rights monitoring is a relatively recent activity that expanded when the
Cold War ended. Monitoring is an important par of the broader process of
promoting human rights. All the Norwegian organizations interviewed carry
out some monitoring activities, but the emphasis varies in accordance with
organizational objectives.
1. NORDEM is a collaborative project between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Norwegian Institute for Human Rights and the Norwegian Refugee Council and is therefore a
more "impure" type of NGO than the other organizations reviewed here. All Norwegian NGOs,
it should be noted, receive large funds from the Norwegian state, and many receive core
funding.
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Human rights monitoring, election assistance and observation, constitute over
90% of NORDEM's workload. Human rights monitoring is also part of the
practical work of the organization, which can produce a spin-off effect on the
human rights situationeven though it does not directly involve monitoring. The
Norwegian Refugee Council co-operates with NORDEM in direct human
rights monitoring
The Norwegian Church Aid does not inc1ude human rights monitoring as a
major par of its activity, which .it defines as humanitarian work. However,
human rights, conflct resolution and peace building are increasingly being
incorporated as dimensions of relief work. For human rights monitoring and
democratization work, the NCA co-operates with NORDEM or the World
Council of Churches. The Norwegian People's Aid has entered an internal
debate on the organization's role in matters of human rights monitoring. Yet, it
has already been involved in such activities in Bosnia and Guatemala. Save the
Children is working for greater recognition of children's rights in a conflct
situation, pointing out that children are among those most strongly affected by
war or conflct. Greater respect for children's rights wil have a positive impact
at least on the consequences of conflct.
The Red Cross is also engaged in human rights monitoring and promotion as a
preventive activity. In several conflct situations, the organization works with
the parties to the conflct to enhance knowledge of human rights and the
Geneva Conventions goveming the conduct of war, often using local cultural
and historical reference points in the educational message (as recently in
Sudan, Somalia and Burundi). As a humanitarian organization it feels
compelled to react to human rights violations, but public reporting may
jeopardize Its efforts to work on all sides of a conflct. Hence, it more of ten
encourages other organizations to report on violations.
Of the Norwegian NGOs interviewed, only NORDEM paricipates in election
monitoring. International election observation stared in the early 1980s and a
more consistent framework has graduaUy evolved. In NORDEM's view,
election monitoring has a positive preventive impact. However, no systematic
assessment has been undertaken. There is growing recognition of the
importance and impact of long-term observation where observers are present
over a longer period of time, including the electoral campaign. In this way,
essential rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly etc. are
also being promoted.
None of the five principal NGOs cites human rights monitoring as a main task.
Nevertheless, as "complex emergencies" have come to be viewed in the
international aid community generally as having a human rights component,
also Norwegian humanItarian NGOs have moved in this directÏon. Most of
them now see human rights monitoring as an important extension of their
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traditional mandate. The NGOs generally conc1uded that human rights
monitoring have a positive impact, but note that a) it is difficult to assess
impact, and b) they lack systematie evaluations to make full assessments.
A general problem noted by all the actors is the lack of coherence in the field of
human rights work (how to report, on what cases, to whom etc.). However,
they all underline the difficulties of creating a common, standardized manual
for human rights work, as there are several different human rights conventions,
and different mandates in different situations. Another generally perceived
problem is the low quality of reporting and training. This is parly attributed to
the recent and rapid growth of human rights monitoring.
The potential conflct between human rights monitoring and maintaining other
forms of humanitarian presence was noted. To reduce such conflcts, NGOs
have developed cooperative strategies based on a division of labor: In a
situation where human rights violations have been observed, the NGOs can
agree on who is to speak out loudly. The organization that reports runs the risk
of being expelled, but the others can stay and continue their work In this way,
co-operation among NGOs on reporting can enhance their over-all impact.
Humanitarian presenee
General views
All the humanitarian NGOs claim that their presenee generally has mitigative
and preventive effects on violence, if not on the underlying sources of the
conflct. However, the only evidence cited in support of this c1aim was
aneedotal. Systematie evaluations/assessments on the subject had not be
undertaken, or were not known to exist.
Norwegian Church Aid maintains that the most effcient protection does not
stem from active reporting to external paries, but from makng it clear within
the conflct area that human rights violations are not tolerated. NCA
emphasizes the need for more active strategies to communicate visibility.
Visible presence may limit violence, for instance, if NGOs move their
headquarers to an area where vIolence is known to take place, or by simply
being more visible in other ways, e.g. by driving cars marked with NGO
emblems.
The Norwegian People's Aid maintains that presence per se has an important
preventive effect on the leve! of violence and on the overall conflct. The
presenee of international delegates, for instance, makes the local employees
feel safer (Kurdistan is cited as an example of this: the presence of Norwegian
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relief workers "guaranteed" the safety of local personneI). The Norwegian
Refugee Council is convinced that presenee means prevention or reduction of
violence, and points to the presence of NGOs in Bosnia where they claim the
visible presence did reduce the level of violence. The NRC also emphasizes
that presence is a precondition for reporting; the preventive effects are thus
associated with reporting. Norwegian Save the Children believes that the
presenee of NGOs has several positive preventive effects. For instance, the
presenee of the SC in conflcts helps prevent the recruitment of child soldiers.
The general psychological effect on the cIvilian population of international
presenee is also seen as very important.
Relief assistance
All the NGOs interviewed agreed that the level of consciousness concerning
the different effects of humanitarian aid is much higher than in it was in the
1980s and before. Their experiences differed with respect to strategies that
might reduce the negative effects of relief assistance, and the extent to which
these are possible to undertake.
The Norwegian People's Aid notes that emergency relief can create passivity,
although this risk must be balanced against the acute needs of the population in
question. While humanitarian aid and supplies can prolong the conflct, lack of
resources is often the main reason for conflct in the first place, and food
shortages can obviously lead to violence. Another potential negative function
of emergency relief noted by the NP A is the creation of new economic
structures that are kept alIve artificia11y through continuous deliveries, thus
undermining traditional and otherwise viable structures.
The delivery of food in conflct situations has been criticized since some of it
wil go to the waring parties. In the Somalia famne in the early 1990s, food
was handed out as ready-made meals in order to reduce the stealing and trading
of food. There are ways of separating civilans from soldiers when handing out
food, but in many situations it is preferable to supply as much food as possible.
Creating an abundance or surplus of food wil reduce the potential for conflict,
according the Norwegian Red Cross.
The Norwegian Refugee Council notes that humanitarian aid may have
negative consequences, but believes that these are by far outweighed by the
positive effects. According to the NRC, it is naive to exclude the possibility
that food delIveries may prolong a conflct, but the humanItarian imperative is
always more important. HumanItarian organizations should not stop bringing in
deliveries to civilans even if it keeps the warring paries going. The NCA cites
cases where humanitarian action has worsened the human rights situation
(Srebrenica). This may happen also in remote areas where food deliveries
attract large number of people, thereby increasing local tension (Ethiopia).
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Neutraliy and impa rtia li y
The organizations recognize that humanitarian aid generally has political
consequences, but that policies of "impariality" - which most distinguish from
"neutrality" - stil are possible. Approaches to the impariality/neutrality
question differ, however.
The NP A's policy permits pariality, inter alia when this faciltates access to
certain areas. This is the case in Sudan, where the NP A does no co-operate with
the Sudanese government and. therefore does not wait for its approval, as do
NGOs in Operation Lifeline Sudan. Generally, however, the NP A considers it
useful to co-operate as far as possible with national governments and with the
UN. In the NCA experience, humanitarian aid has had political consequences
even when thought the NCA does not have specifically political objectives.
The NRC has found that political neutrality can only be intended, and not fully
achieved, because presence in a conflct necessarily caries a political
dimension. "Impariality" is thus a better word than "neutrality". The NRC also
points out that not takng sides on grounds of "neutrality" does not a1ways
mean being neutral. Not seeing or hearing is not neutrality, but an indirect
support of the stronger pary. In the NRC experience, it is important in such
cases to report with reference to conventions/agreements. For instance, the
NRC reported that the Serbs were ignoring the UN Convention on refugees in
former Yugoslavia.
Confidence-building
Some of the organizations are engaged in activities that can be grouped under
the general heading of confidence building measures (inc1uding reconcilation
and negotiations related to a peace process), others find that their regular work
has confidence-building effects. The organizations work at different levels
(state level, community level, individual level) , but all emphasize the
importanee of the local leve!. Some have found indirect, low-profie projects
most useful; here groups work on concrete projects and "confidence" or
"reconciliation" appears as a positive side effect.
To exert a preventive effect, the Red Cross movement has found it is essential
to be present at an early stage of a conflet, or even before a conflct starts.
Early waring of potential areas of conflct or natural disasters requires
institutional networks. The national Re societies can serve this purpose, and
are being developed with local branches that cover the entire country. The idea
that local agencies wil have a stronger preventive effect emerged in the 1990s.
The establishment of local Re socIeties is a continuous task, and in Africa goes
back to the 1970s. UntIl the late 1980s, however, the IFRC concentrated on
strengthening the central agency of the national societies, and hoped for a
cascading effect downwards (local branches). As experience show ed that this
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was rare, institutional strategy shifted to focus on local branches as well as
national headquarers. Increasingly, efforts are made to work locally in human
rights and tension reduction programs by educating locals, building on local,
traditional values, etc.
The NP A supports existing grass root movements as well as the establishment
of new local organizations. The NP A has found that the most important task is
to bu ild or rebuild confidence to "others" and to key social structures. When
supporting local organizations, the NP Aassists with. expertise and provides
materiaL. It is seeks to create channels of contact between local organizations
and the authorities. While no systematic assessments of impact have been done,
the general conc1usion in the NP A is that confidence-building can work. For
instance, in Tuzla, the only remaining multieultural municipality in Bosnia, the
presence of NPA, the NCA and other international agencies is considered to
have enabled the population to resist ethnic c1eansing.
The NCA has several confidence-building activities on both the local and
national level. Two current "multicultural projects" are underway in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. A 3-year project for persons from the former
Yugoslavia seeks to educate "multicultural" opinion leaders from different
parts of former country. In Rwanda, the project is aimed at women from
different ethnic groups. The women work together to find solutions to common
problems. The project has a pracÜcal focus, but the proeess of problem-solving
is expected to prornote communication between the different ethnic groups. A
review of the project conc1uded: (i) the project was most successful when
building on already existing groups, and (li) problems experienced were related
to insufficient training and knowledge of personneI, as well as lack of c1early
defined objectives. NCA paricipation in the peace process in Mali (1995) has
been reviewed in an intern al report which found that the foundation for success
was a bottom-up socio-political movement, with negotiation below the
government level.
The Norwegian Refugee Council is not engaged in confidence building
measures at the political level, but works to bring together people from
different sides of a conflct in various activities. Confidence building is
considered a positive spin-off effect, and not the main objective.
Save the Children is not involved in explicit reconciliation or confidence
building activities. The organization's experience is that this is an extremely
complex area of work. Reconciliation is seen as a private and personal matter,
and the SC finds that the work of the international community in this regard is
too mechanical. Reconcilation works at a slow pace: direct reconciliation work
must be avoided, even the word "reconcilation" should not be flagged. If one
moves into this area at all, community workers must be carefully trained and
able to inspire confidence. Indirectly this may generate further confidence
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toward others. . Relief work should have concrete foci were people work
together to solve common problems. This type of co-operation (as in Bosnia)
may produce a spin-off effects in terms of reconciliation.
The state of the current knowledge and directions for
further work
In the discussion of preventiv e measures - both in the social science literature
and among aid actors - there is considerable unclarity about two critical issues:
. what is to be prevented?
. what are the limits of preventive action?
Preventive policies must be clear about precisely what they are to prevent. The
classic trade-off between peace and justiee cannot always be avoided. A policy
designed to prevent conflct could easily disguise a policy to preserve (an
unjust) status quo, or to defend one social order at the cost of another. Given
different concepts of social order and rights - differences that some observers
claim are increasing in the 1990s and takng the form of dash of civilizations
(Huntington 1993) - these are unavoidable implications of a preventive policy.
To some extent, these dilemmas are sidestepped by focusing on preventing
vialenee as an instrument of social change, rather than preventing conflct in a
more general sense.
The logic of preventive action, moreover, suggests modest y of ambition. Social
science tells us quite a bit about why socia! contradictions sometimes develop
to produee violence. Recently, this has generated considerable writings on
"preventive diplomacy" as one powerful arm of preventive action (Lund 1996,
Rupesinghe 1993). Yet, as noted by Zolberg and Suhrke (1995, 1997)
knowledge of causes does not readily translate into policy. There are reasons of
scientific logic: most simply put, the complexity of socIal reality makes it
difficult to anticipate the consequences of intervention. More fundamentally,
because any situation has roots in the past, preventive interventions constitute
in some measure attempts to remake history. This poses formidable challenges
for policy, and the part that humanitarian assistance can possibly play in this
regard must be adjusted accordingly.
As noted at the outset, the present literature on the mitigating and preventive
functions of humanitarian assistanee is quite limited. The recorded institutional
memory of NGOs is fragmented. Part of the problem, as noted above, is
methodological: in the field of preventive measures, it is more difficult to
assess successes than failures, since we do not know precisely what was
prevented if prevention really worked. These probIerns are not insurmountable,
however, as the increasingly case-study based literature on of preventive
diplomacy demonstrates (cpr. Jentleson 1997). An important step towards
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filing the present gaps in knowledge about the impact of humanitarian action
on social conflct would be to collect and systematize the very considerable
experience that the NGOs have accumulated. In a very modest way, this review
has stared to do this with respect to the major Norwegian NGOs.
It was beyond the capacity of this report to make a systematic survey of
evaluations/studies undertaken by, or for, the major international NGOs. To do
so should be the next step. Secondly, systematic evaluation of NGO activities
in paricular conflct areas would yield critically important knowledge. The
work of humanitarian NGOs is increasingly being evaluated, but so far with
reference to criteria of effciency or impact that do not inc1ude the impact on
the conflct (or on the leve! of violence in the conflct) in which the
organizations are working, and the implications for mitigating and preventing
violence. These conflict criteria should be brought in. The same applies to
international agencies and the UN organizations. The UN organizations were
not covered by the mandate of this study, yet they are rapidly accumulating
experiences and some institutional memories at the cross-roads between
humanitarian assistance and conflct. While structurally the UN organizations
are in a different position than the NGOs, some of their experiences reflect
cause-and-effect relationships that apply more broadly. Some lessons may be
transferable, and should be scrutinized for this purpose.
The continuing overarching questions are those posed at the outset of this
report. The answers should help to inforff policy and develop operational
guidelines so that humanItarian assistanee may serve to mitigate conflct rather
than itself becoming incorporated in a cycle of violence.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose and scope of study: the terms of reference
This report seeks to systematize current knowledge about the contribution of
non-state actors, primarily NGOs, to prevent or mitigate violent conflct by
providing various forms of humanitarian assistance, including some
confidence-building measures. The report summarizes and analyzes the state of
knowledge based on the sociaLscience literature as well as reports, debates and
recorded experiences in the aid and NGO community. In addition, the
experience of aid agencies/organizations in particular cases are drawn upon. In
a separate chapter (4), experiences of major Norwegian NGOs as these are
represented in the "institutional memory" are summarized and systematized.
The report was prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
according to terms of reference as specified. (For complete Terms of
References, see Appendix ll.
1.2 The literature
Several traditions of writing converge on the relationship between
humanitarian assistance and conflct. The two which mostly concern us here
focus on humanitarian assistance. They consist of
. reflective recording of experience by aid agencies/organizations, and their
assessment of relevant policies and principles whîch affect humanitarian
work
. observations and evaluations of humanitarian assistance by independent
writers (including academics, other experts and journalists)
There is also a very large socIal science literature dealing with social and
international conflct, and a growing body of theoretical and applied research
on the relationship between aid and conflct more generally. This literature is
much toa large and unwieldy to be summarized here, and we shall instead draw
on it selectively when related to a paricular topîc. The same applies to the legal
literature, in paricular, on international humanitarian law. Since this report
focuses on policy practices and social impact rather than the legal framework
for action, legal texts wil not be included.
1.3 A new agenda
There are several reasons why the relationship between humanitarian assistance
and conflct has attracted growing attention in recent times. Allocations to
humanitarian assistance have increased dramatically and - despite statistical
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uncertainties--caseload estimates have also surged (IFRC 1995). According to
OECD/DAC figures, emergency aid has increased from 2% to 6 % of total aid
(1990-1996). Total emergency aid in 1994 was about 3.5 bilion dollars, with
perhaps an additional 1 bilion from private sources. And while the number of
international refugees stabilized in the early 1990s around 14 milion, UNHCR
placed its protective umbrella over a much larger group of "peoples of
concern", and the estimate of internally displaced went to 30 million (Deng
1993). The end of the Cold War opened up new space for the United Nations
and NGOs to enter conflcts with a humanitarian mandate - space that
previously had been the pre serve of the large powers or their c1ients. A paralleI
and shar increase in the growth of NGOs reflects this development as well as
the ideological change towards privatization which also affected the aid domain
(Donini 1996, Weiss and Gordenker 1996).
While it is difficult to find meaningful figures to show that violent conflcts
have increased in the post-Cold War period, a not unexpected turbulenee in the
wake of the profound changes in world order caused protracted violence in
pars of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, and contributed to "failed
states" or "genocidal states" in pars of Africa. These conflcts generated
massive humanItarian emergencies that evoked public opinion and
international action. As a result, a new humanitarian scene evolved that has
several characteristics:
. aid responsibility: donor states accept a general responsibility to mitigate
the consequences of violent conflct elsewhere by providing humanitarian
assistance;
. expanded humanitarian space: donors are delegating greater responsibility
to aid agencies/ organizations, and states are pressed to permit the latter to
enter and car out their activities;
. UN centered humanitarian assistance: distinct from state humanitarianism,
the marked growth of the UN in the humanitarian field has raised issues of
coordination on the practical leve!, and of impariality versus parisan
assistance on the moral-political leve! (Rufin 1992);
. freedom of action for humanitarian agencies: agencies negotiate directly
with conflcting paries on issues that often go beyond purely humanitarian
issues and affect domestie sovereignty;
. destructured conflcts: fragmentation of paries to a conflcts, often wIth
diffuse political objectives and typically involving large number of
civilans;
.. strong cross-border linkages: relief operations operate vast logistical
network across borders that involve or affect the intern al paries to the
conflct differentially.
WIth some five bilion dollars being spent annually on humanitarian re1ief in
complex political situations of this kind, increasing attention is being paid to
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thepoliticalimplications Lof . humanitarian assistance. Can humanitarian
assistance be given in such away that it prevents or mitigates conflict? Or, at
least, does not make conflct worse? What are the intended and unintended
political consequences of assistance? What are the relevant aid strategies and
their effects? On a more fundamental leve!, questions are being asked about
principles of accountability and neutrality - can and should humanitarian
assistance be neutral? - and about humanitarian imperatives in relation to .the
interests of states and NGOs.
This report seeks to systematize the contemporar discussion of these
questions.
1.4 The team
The report is based on work carried out by three principal researchers: Bente
Hybertsen and Gro Tjore, former students at the Human Rights program, Chr.
Michelsen Institute, Emery Brusset, a doctoral candidate at the London School
of Econornics and with contributions from Bruce Jones, also a doctoral
candidate at the LSE. Astri Suhrke, Senior Fellow at the Chr. Michelsen
Institute, was team leader.
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2 PRINCIPAL
THOUGHT
ISSUES AND SCHOOLS OF
The impact ofhumanitarian assistance on conflct - both in its mitigative and
preventive aspects - has long been a subject for policy and theory. Two
opposite schools of thought should be noted at the outset. One is the Red Cross
idea of aid as imparial, neutral and independent, serving humanitarian
objectives of limiting the human suffering brought on by conflct. A contrary
view holds that humanitarian assistance has explicit poliiicål objectives such as
preventing conflet, or supporting one of the paries. Cutting across this
dichotomy is another c1assic distinction: should humanitarian assistance seek to
deal with the causes of conflct (a "root-cause" approach), or only address the
symptoms (a "Band-Aid" approach).
2.1 Prevention and population movements
During the Cold War, early efforts to link humanitarian assistance with
preventive policies focused on the refugee movements and their causes. A UN
Group of Governmental Experts on International Cooperation to A vert New
Flows of Refugees presente d its report in 1985. The report criticized the lack of
respect of international law by sovereign states, and recommended the peaceful
resolution of disputes. In a prefiguration of UN Resolution 46/182, it
recommended more information sharing on the factors of refugee flows, and
added capacity for the specialized agencies to resp ond rapidly.
More substantive policy recommendations emerged from the report of a
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Mass Exoduses (1981), appointed by
the UN Commssion on Human Rights. Authored by Sadruddin Aga Khan, a
former High Commssioner for Refugees, the report urged international
cooperation to attack the root causes of refugee movements. In addition to
measures directed at the economic and political and environment al causes of
outflows, the report proposed concepts that were innovative at the time: the
widespread use of humanitarian observers, the development of an Early
Waring system, and the use of Special Representatives for Humanitarian
Questions (UN 1981).
Sadruddin Aga Khan went on to head the Independent Commission for
International Humanitarian Issues, set up in 1983 by the help of the Crown
Prince of Jordan and supported by the UN General Assembly. The Commission
sought to identify ways of strengthening the implementation of existing
humanitarian norms, in which humanItarian assistance was seen as a secondary
policy instrument (Winningthe Human Race? 1988)
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By the end of the 1980s, concerns to avert refugee flows became more
pronounced. The policy and theory discussion that accompanied this concern
pointed in two directions:
. to deal with the underlying causes requires comprehensive policies that
must be Integrated with the foreign policies of states (see e.g. A World in
Dispute, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993, and Hocke,
"Beyond Humanitarianism" 1 990), but
. some measures to provide increased protection in place - i.e. in the domain
of humanitarian assistance strategies - might help to avert international
flows. (see sec. 3 below).
2.2 Emergency relief and civil wars: The First generation
debate
Until the 1970s, the literature on emergencies was dominated by technical
concerns of relief in natural and man-made disasters, and protection of
refugees. The civil war in Nigeria, however, crystallized the need for aid actors
to rethink the practice and doctrines of emergency response. Nigeria
highlighted normative dilemmas that had received little systematic attention
outside the international Red Cross movement. Emergency aid and media
coverage had a significant and clearly visible impact on the intern al balance of
power in the cIvil war, and east doubt on the principle of neutrality which until
then had been the dominant paradigm of humanitarianism. The issue of local
capacity building was also introduced. Vocal critics attacked the Red Cross, in
paricular, and the international community in general, for excessive
subordination to rules of sovereignty in times of civil war. They raised the
alternative of cross-border intervention as a legitimate respons e in exceptional
circumstances (Cuny 1991, Kouchner 1987).
In France, events in Nigeria were later lInked by Bernard Kouchner and others
to the debates on wars of liberation and tiers mondism; in Britain and the
United States the links were made with cIvil society. This underpinning in
political philosophy made the debates contInue in the 1970s even though relief
remained a small concern. In general, both sides acknowledged the need for aid
to remain impartial - or neutral, in the sense of maintaining a ca1culated
distance from the political positions of the paries - and limit itself to a quasi
medical diagnosticof the situation. There was disagreement on another critical
point: one side believed it counter-productive to negotiate access with the
authorities, preferring to caU on solidarity to justify intervention, even when
violating sovereignty.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia at the end of the 1970s heightened the debate. The political
dimensions of sustaining large refugee communities through humanitarian
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assistance was being noticed. The term "refugee-warrior communities" was
coined by scholars (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguyao 1989). Aid organizations
developed concepts of cross-border solidarityand the Medecins Sans Frontieres
gave it new meaning in practice. In Franee, one talked of the Sans Frontieres
era. According to arecent MSF publication (Jean 1993), the aid community
capitalized on the strategic nature of borders in these Cold War related conflcts
in order to promote humanitarian objectives. The underlying principle of
humanitarianism was not questioned, rather, how closely it should be tied to
international humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions).
Some have argued that it was this proximity to the powers of the Cold War that
east the first serious doubts on the age of humanitarian innocence. In Ethiopia
in 1984 the international community was obliged, by the logic of humanitarian
aid, to intervene on both sides of the conflict. It also entered into a political
dialogue with the government regarding the treatment of its own population.
The debate on neutrality beeame acute, with one group advocating taking sides
on the basis of human rights and justice. The solidarity approach was moved
forward, eventually to be ariculated forcefully in the late 1980s and the 1990s
in a second-generation of the debate. articulated e.g. by Alex de Waal and the
activist organization African Rights.
2.3 Humanitarian aid and internat wars: The Second
generation debate
The first policy-oriented review caried out of a complete emergency response
operation (Minear et al. 1992) hinted at new systemic challenges and
requirements. The term "complex emergency" emerged in the corridors of the
UN General Assembly during negotiations on Resolution 46/182 which
established the UN Department of HumanItarian Affairs, and was designed to
identify situations requiring special emergency response. The "complexity"
refers to the interlocking causes, justifications and aims, which require more
comprehensive solutions than those devised by simple "relief" methods.
Political realignments, as well as accelerated social change induced by
globalisation, had fostered increasing international dis order, inter aUa
manifested in the collapse and failure of states. These emergencies were
problematic in terms of the principle of sovereignty, and hence also in relation
to international law and traditional aid. As a result, the foreign policy
dimensions of complex emergencies have generated interest in circles that are
not normally concerned with humanitarian response (national security
communities, international organizations, academic political science circles,
etc.).
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What characterizes these crises is the central place civilian populations occupy
as both targets and. victims in the conflct (Andreopoulos, Shulman and
Howard 1994). In a major work, Le Piege Humanitaire, the French writer Jean-
Christophe Rufin (1992) notes that the combatants in these types of conflcts
seek a new basis of power: from Cold War linkages and assistance to financial
autonomy and emotional appeal to the population. Control can be achieved by
the use of repressive violence, manipulation of economic goods, and appeal to
traditional social solidarities.
War-economies of this kind are decentralized and predatory. Aid from the
outside is potentially a major source of power for the combatants in achieving
controlover populations and territory. As a result, the paries have a desire to
see assistance coming in, but also a direct interest in its allocation. While this
favored easier access for the aid organizations, it also allowed for a more
politicized delivery proeess. The debate between "pure humanitarianism"
versus "solidarity humanitarianism" reached a new stage.
2.3. 1 "Pure" versus "solidarity" humanitarianism
The advocates of "pure humanitarianism" were promoting an exclusive vision
of needs (needs of an economic and biological nature were the only proper
basis of intervention), whereas "solidarity humanitarianism" expressed an
inclusive vision (needs must be addressed within the wider context of what
caused them, including the power structures). The critical differenee between
the two centered on the question of access. The "pure" humanitarians wanted
access to atten d to needs, the other as par of taking sides. il one case access
was not even an issue: it was automatically granted by some, and refused by
others. To be neutral meant a much more complex process of confidence
building and negotiation.
These contradictions emerged as a central issue in the literature on emergency
response. It is analyzed in the work of Peter Walker (1992), Andrew Natsios
(1995) and Fred Cuny (1991) as well as the works of Lar Minear and Thomas
Weiss (1995) and Alex de Waal (1994).
In the UN humanItarian system, the issue was defined in terms of institutional
arangements: how could different approaches to local authority, and to the
dichotomy of enforcement versus consensual access, be reconciled without
creating dysfunctionalities? The UN's "Inter-Agency Standing Committee" was
for example dominated by such debates, which led to the publication of the
working paper on Humanitarian Mandates in Conflict Situations, by UNDHA
(1993). On the NGO side, these issues were addressed in Organizational
Adaptation in Times of Conflict (for the UK-based Conflct and Developrnent
Programming Network, 1994), and Confliet, Development and Military
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Intervention: The Role, Position and Experience of NGOs (for the Liaison
Committee of Development NGOs to the European Union, 1994).
At the same time, there was a reorientation in the strategic studies community
to concepts of conflct and the importance of societies and legitimating
processes in security. The writings on common security (Evans 1993), on the
role of civil society in stabilty, on the critique of realist state-centric
paradigms, and the rise of practical conflct resolution programs helped shift
attention to the UN and jts aid work. These writings also adopted a non-
militar and gradualist posture which made them an intermediar between the
advocates of force and those of consensual access (either tactical consent of all
authorities, as the ICRC required, or of a counterpar ally, as the Norwegian
People's Aid required). The neutral approach remained split between the Sans
Frontieres and the negotiated positon, but a high degree of mutual
accommodation was in fact reached in the field.
The debate on access moved forward in 1988/89 with the disappearance of the
polarization of the Security CounciL. Operation Lifeline Sudan represented a
breakthrough of humanitarian assistance as agencies entered into the "high
politics" of mediation and negotiation between the rebel movement and the
government in the Sudan civil war. By negotiating corridors of access, aid
offcials intermittently and temporarily brought a degree of consensus to the
adversarial context (Mine ar 1991).
The dilemmas of providing humanitarian assistance in the midst of severe
conflet, however, were accentuated in the 1994 Rwanda conflct. For some aid
workers, the genocide was so fundamentally evIl that it demanded only ane
response: public denunciation and intervention. To remain in Rwanda and
provide humanitarian assistance was fundamentally immoral because it
detracted atten ti on from the primar need to combat evil, or because aid
organizations chose to remain quiet about the evIl they observed in order to be
able to continue working in the country. The contradiction between the
organizational interest of safeguarding access and thereby delivering services,
on the one hand, and the interest of the victims in protection, thus came to a
head. The contradiction paralleled that between (certainly) helping a few and
(possibly) helping many. The contradictions have been brillantly analyzed by
two committed French doctors of the MSF (Brauman 1994, Destexhe 1996).
The solidarity argument has here moved forward: Brauman and Destexhe
advocate total solidarity with the victims of evil.
2.3.2 Interventionist Approaches
The radical interventionist, or coercive approach to crisis, assumes that consent
has no value in the face of grave and massive violations of basic human rights.
In this view, issues of access that the aid agencies had stared to grapple with
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'became irrelevant. The interventionists and the "pure humanitarians" disagreed
on all fundamentaIs: The latter advocated a certain codification of the process
of conflct (neútralassistance and an exc1usive, minimalist vision of needs),
while the former sought 00 to promote a certain end state with respect to the
conflct itself.
Coercive approaehes to conflct settlement were discussed at the unprecedented
heads of states meeting of the Security Council of J anuar 1992, and were
implicit in the new Secretar General's Agenda for Peace (1992). Humanitarian
aid was not given a central place in that document; however, emergency
budgets of states and the UN' s Consolidated Appeals grew at an unprecedented
rate. Less radical but nevertheless intrusive approaehes inspired paralleI
thinking on reforms of the UN system and the regional bodies to better serve
humanitarian imperatives (Chi1ders and Urquhar 1991). The result was, inter
alia, the Deparment of Humanitarian Affairs (DRA) and ECHO.
The humanitarian response in the aftermath of the Gulf War, when a "safe
haven" was established for the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, seemed to
vindicate an interventionist approach. The responseof the aid ageneies was
fragmented and uncoordinated (Minear et aL. 1992). Yet, the establishment of
the zone itself was widely supported as a humanitarian response to a complex
political-humanitarian emergency and as a de facto trusteeship for a vulnerable
population. The political dimensions of the humanitarian operation were
several and parially ambiguous, but at least one was clearly preventive: to
prevent further conflct between the Kurdish population and the central Iraqi
regime of Saddam Russein. As such, it became a c1assic case of humanitarian
policies introduce in a conflct situation in order to mitigate and prevent
violence. For a time, these objectives were attained, but subsequent
developments pointed to the limitations of protected zones of this kind (see
3.3).
The establishment of the zone in northern Iraq, and especially later
interventions in Somalia and Bosnia, placed two new issues squarely on the
agenda of the aid agencies: What was an appropriate relationship between
miltar and humanitarian agencies in aUN enforcement actions? And what is
the relationship between enforcement and humanitarian interventions ? The
latter led to a new normative position that linked humanitarian mandates to
Chapter 7 enforcement ofpeace-keeping operations (Reed and Kaysen 1993).
The relationship between humanitarian action and security was examined in a
major study recently completed by Adam Roberts, a leading UK expert on
peacekeeping (Roberts 1996). Published by the Institute for International
Strategies Studies in London, the study a1so addresses fundamental problems of
the doctrine of impartiality. Analysing cases of humanitarian intervention since
the end of the Cold War, Roberts explores the distinction between impariality
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and neutrality, the variety of forms of humanitarian action (he restricts the term
'intervention' to use of militar force), as well as coordination and early
warning. His centraL argument is that the principal cause of setbacks in
'humanitarian action' has been the failure of states to develop serious policies to
providing security for humanitarian activities during conflct. He points to the
inconsistency of UN decisions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, and the failure
in those three instances to forge an appropriate relationship between security
and the provision of humanItarian relief.
Par of the difficulty, Roberts argues, is the principle of impariality and
neutrality which many relief agencies observe. There is a difficult relationship
between impariality and security: for example, a strict adherence to the
definition of impariality, and a resultant unwilingness to be associated with
security forces, may lead agencies to abandon populations when there is no
secure access to them. Roberts does not wish to relinquish the principle of
impariality. He does, however, argue that the implications of impariality need
to be reconsidered in light of the need to recognize that, in practice,
humanitarian assistance cannot be considered in isolation from the provision of
security. Roberts gives HUle consideration to the distinction between neutrality
and impariality, and the existence of other interpretations of impariality than
that of the ICRC. While pointing out that enforcing the laws of war is a main
avenue of humanitarian action, Roberts does not explore how relief agencies
could adopt rules-based interpretations of impariality that would allow
cooperation with security forces when one or more parties to a conflct violate
international humanitarian laws.
2.3.3 The negative impact of a/d
The conflcts in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda led to growing recognition that
humanitarian assistance had a potentially negative impact on the conflct whose
victims it sought to help. Humanitarian assistance, it was daimed, had at least
three general, negative consequences:
. it became a substitute for more decisive political action
. it prolonged the conflct by giving each side additional material resources to
continue to fight, at the very least by helping to keep theIr dependent
populations alive
. it raised expectations of relieving suffering that could not be fulfilled
The first point was in paricular argued in relation to the former Yugoslavia by
both a prominent international lawyer (Higgins 1993), and a dose observer-
journalist (Rieff i 996). An evaluation of FInnish foreign aid captured one
dimension succinctly when noting that "it sometimes appeared in Bosnia that
donors did not care for the death of civilans, as long as they did not die
hungry" (COWIConsult 1996).
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TheargumenI was also developedin relation to Rwanda, both with respect to
the genocide inside Rwanda and relief to refugee communities in neighboring
Zaire (Prunier 1996, Adelman and Suhrke 1996). All three points were
developed with particular reference to Somalia in a recent book by a writer and
former aid worker (Maren 1997).
Fundamental criticism also was expressed by two writers who approached the
subject from quite different pt,rspectives and backgrounds.
The work by Mark Duffield, a British academic, poses a radical challenge to
the normative assumptions of the mitigative and preventive impact of
humanitarian relief (Duffield 1994, 1994b, 1995, 1996). In essence, Duffield
argues that the North has reached a form of institutional accommodation wIth
complex emergencies in the South. HumanItarian aid, he argues, has become
the North's principal mechanism of conflict management in the South. The
impacts of this accommodation are manifold: a reduction in the quality of aid
and an uneven pattern of intervention. In all, Duffeld maintains that the current
system of response to complex emergencies represents a crisis of
developmentalism in the North.
The accommodation of NGOs to these states of permanent emergency is to
Duffield "elegant and terrifying in equal measure." In a powerful and influential
essay in 1996, The Symphony of the Damned, Duffield argued the willngness
of NGOs and other western actors to make an institutional accommodation to
permanent emergencies in Africa represented a new form of racism. As a
result, Duffeld insists that a number of socIeties are now in what rnght be
called 'permanent emergencies.' He argues that the dynamics of self-sustaining
war economies are litte understood among those in the relief, development,
and conflct management communities who operate on the assumption that
civIl conflct and war are aberrations in otherwise non-violent socIal systems.
Along with David Keen (1995), Duffield has made important contributions to
our understanding of a new "political economy of intern al war", wherein - in
Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone - war is not an aberration but a system of
political and economic resource allocation. A recognition of this system also
compels a radical rethinking of such concepts as neutrality. Duffield advocates
a new ethic of working in protracted political crisis which adopts solidarity,
rather than neutrality, as the guiding principle for action.
On a more concrete leve!, the 1989 book work by two US-based experts, Mary
Anderson and Peter Woodrow, Rising from the Ashes examined developmental
strategies in a disaster situation. Their work also contributed to greater
awareness of the negative consequences of humanitarian assistance. In
particular, Anderson and Woodrow found evidence that the ways in which
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humanitarian agencies provide aid affect beneficiar capacity to achieve
sustainable development. Inparticular, the impact of relief assistance on the
environmental and social systems within which recipients operate was
highlighted as a little understood, but critical, factor in determining whether or
notrelief efforts would indeed have preventive or mitigative consequences.
Furthermore, especially in period of conflct or post-conflct rebuilding,
decisions resources by UN agencies and NGOs about the division and
allocation of resources wil significantly impact on the capacities of and
opportunities available to paries to.a conflct or recently ended conflct.
In subsequent work, Anderson has sharpened a conc1usion inherent in Rising
from the Ashes although not drawn out within it: that there is evidence that
development and relief programs can, inadvertently, contribute to the
probability of armed conflct and disaster (Anderson 1994, 1996). Similarly,
anthropologists such as Pottier (1996), Hutehinson (1996) or Turton (in Fukui
and Markaks 1994), documented the perverse effect of many relief practices
on the coping strategies of 10cal peop1e. The disparity of treatment of
beneficiaries was noted, as well as the technical inappropriateness of aid.
Human rights groups questioned the 10ng term effects of aid on the protection
of populations. The counterargument was that assistance should be made to be
accountable to the beneficiaries.
2.3.3.1 The stakeholders
The accommodation of relIef agencies to the protracted crisis of the Sudan also
led to further questions about "the innocence of the agencies". Whose interests
were the humanitarian organizations really serving? Thus a third debate
surfaced in the aid community. Following the first debate on neutrality and the
sec ond on the relief-to-development continuum, this third debate concerned the
stakeho1ders. It revo1ved around the issue of the identity of the groups and
principles which should guide the work of the humanitarians, paricularly in
complex emergencies. For the NGOs, it raised especially critical issues.
This was the end of the age of innocence. Recognizing that their activities were
not "beyond sociology" (de Waal 1994), the aid organizations actively
paricipated in the deconstruction.
The contradictory rationalities of aid organization operating in the midst of
conflct were well summarized in a paper by the Norwegian Church Aid
(Vilumstad 1995). Examining policy in the Sudan, Vilurnstad lists the
conflcting demands of (a) public opinion, whose primar concern is to recreate
a modicurn of safety in are as it is aware of (primarily through media coverage),
(b) organizational interests to develop spheres of influence and stabilty, (c) the
integrity of a code of conduct during war, (d) the containment of the
destruction wreaked on the economy and livelihoods.
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The issues of stakeholders were also raised by Alex de Waal and Omaar (l 994)
Mark Duffield (1995), David Keen (1995), Jean Christophe Rufin (1992), and
Mar Anderson (1989). The negative dimensions noted above were scrutinized
with particular reference to the fole of the aid organizations. The list included
. the possible role of aid in reinforcing the combatants
. the NGO's quasi-commercial competition for funds and the resulting
subordination to a handful of donors
. the distortion of policy by media and politicians
. the tendency to overwhelm of local capacity and ecology in the rush for
delivery
. the tendency by agencies/organizations to exaggerate their success in the
pursuit of more (Borton 1995)
Accountability was a key issue. The question had early on been raised with
respect to the UN administration in protest against the bending of rules in the
name of financial and personnei accountabilty. As for the NGOs, criticism
focused on excessive zealin promoting "delivery" at the expense of, or instead
of, justice and protection for the beneficiaries. Even the emphasis placed on
staff security appeared as par of a protective institutional backlash. It was
argued that the organizations behaved as if the primary accountabilty was to
themselves.
Criticism also came from another quarer. International relations officials and
experts, militar planners and political commentators began to question the
separation of emergency response from the international efforts to resolve the
conflct. One prominent diplomat argued that emergency aid should be
deliberately used as a political tool: relief aid should be withheld as par of
political sanctions, and the UN specialized agencies - which typically channel
over half of all resources into a complex emergency operation - should be
subordinated to the policymakng of the UN Secretariat (Sahnoun 1995).
Last but not least, there was accountability to the donors. Concerned donors
to ok steps to improve the quality of information they required from
implementing parners. From rough effectiveness indicators, there was a
growing demand for impact and outcome indicators.
2.3.4 "Do No Harm"
The mounting awareness of the negative effects of humanitarian assistance has
been countered variously. Some have called for moderation, and a return to a
"pure humanitarianism" (Slim 1995). Anderson and others have moved
towards two strands of argumentation:
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First, international agencies involved in war-torn societies should adopt
the physicians motto, "first do no har. " The "do no harm" approach to
regulating the negative consequences of humanitarian assistance now arguably
forms the conventional wisdom among agencies, and is being put into practice
in innovative approaches to relief delivery, perhaps most concretely in Liberia,
where international agencies have adopted a 'Joint Policy of Operations' in
efforts to ensure that their relief efforts wil mitigate rather than fuel the civil
conflct there.
Second, Anderson has conc1uded (1996) that the best way to ensure that
relief has a preventive and mitigative aspect, rather than a negative impact, is to
centre efforts on supporting local capacities for peace and development. Thus,
while the emphasis in Anderson's work remains on non-state actors, there has
been a shift of focus from international NGOs and their local counterpars. This
parallels an earlier literature on refugee aid which emphasizes the need to
develop paricipatory approaehes in relief operations (Harell-Bond 1986); the
issues subsequently moved forward in discussions of strategies in the relief-to-
development continuum (see 3.3. below).
Recognizing the problematie side of assistance, some aid
agencies/organizations sought to redefine the humanitarian challenge. The Red
Cross/Red Crescent movement asked:
"While we can better target resources and increase effciency and
effectiveness, what of the causes? Is humanitarian assistance being used as a
Band-Aid to cover inaction at fundamentalieveIs in addressing the causes of
today's disasters? At the 1995 International Conference of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent, some 142 govemments joined in debate with the Red Cross and
Red Crescent international and national components on humanitarian issues,
with the Movement urging govemments to address the policy vacuum.
Humanitarian assistance alone cannot address marry of today' s crises. Political
and economic action, toa, must be taken by governments to underpin effectÏve
humanitarian assistance whose independence and neutrality is respected and
guaranteed" (IFRC; World Disasters Report 1995: 7)
A "no hars" position effectively abandons any claim that humanitarian
assistance can be an effective tool of conflct prevention. The best it can
achieve is to do no harm. A similar modest claim is reflected in the general
discussion on the role of aid as an instrument of conflct prevention.
The Agenda for Peace by Boutros Boutros-Ghali caught the imagination of aid
workers in advocating a policy of peace-building, which, even though the
Secretary General did not define it so, could be understood as a means of
preventing an escalation or further conflct. Humanitarian assistance is not
assigned a major role in this respect, howerver. The same applies to other
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major "aid for peace" works. The Australian "blue book" on the UN placed
issues of preventive ,diplomacy in the context of a reformed United Nations
(Evans 1993, 1994); the Commssion on Global Governance (1995) which
discussed aid and peace generally, as was the case in Canada, where CIDA
support rethinking that led e.g, to the publication of Aid as Peacemaker:
Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict by Robert Miler
in 1992. Since then, the possible preventive role of aid has been the subject of
increasing discussion and research, parly stimulated by the OECD/DAC task
force on Aid and Conflctprevention.
In this overall picture, the preventive role of humanitarian assistance -
delivered in the acute phase of crisis - prima fade seems limited. The policy
options are generally defined as providing simply humanitarian aid while
seeking to do no harm (the minimalist option) or - for those who go beyond a
"no harm" position - as very modestly mitigating existing violence or
preventing an escalation of the conflct. Activities in pursuit of the latter is
usually seen as an extension of humanitarian work. The critical tools are
. handling of information (advocacy, denunciation, lobbying), and
. providing good offices to facilitate dialogue, to mediate or conciliate on the
margins of standard aid work.
Such preventive extension of humanitarian work is seen as the natural province
of NGOs, because of sovereignty sensitivites, and their proxirnty to the
societal actors (Crocker et.a!. 1996).
2. 4 The logic of prevelltüve action
To better understand the lirnted influence which humanitarian assistance can
have in preventing conflet, it is necessary to place it in the con text of the logic
of preventive action.
As noted by Zolberg and Suhrke (1995, 1997) social science tells us quite a bit
about why social contradictions sometimes develop to produce violence. This
has generated considerable writings about the concept of "preventive
diplomacy", as one powerful ar of preventive action (Lund 1996, Rupesinghe
1993). Yet knowledge of causes does not readily translate into policy. There are
reasons of scientific logic: most simply put, the complexity of social reality
makes it difficult to anticipate the consequences of intervention. Bach root
cause is in itself an intricate structure; their interaction to create social conflct
is correspondingly complex. Even if one set of variables were modified (e.g.
relating to economic inequality or ethnic antagonism) the overall impact on the
leve1 and nature of conflict would be uncertain and could be counterproductive
by creating rather than pre venting violence.
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Anotherreasonforcaution is embedded in the logic of history. During the
latter part of the Cold War, global competition and competitive intervention of
the superpowers were significant causes of war and humanItarian emergencies.
Preventive policy could focus on simple negative injunctions: "Do not
intervene militarily and competitively in local conflcts", "Do not support
client-regimes that resort to repression for lack of legitimacy", etc. These rules
are less relevant in the post-C old War period. After bipolarity gave way to a
diffuse and complex structure of international relations, it has become more
difficult to identify and address the sources of action that produee conflcts.
More fundamentally, because any situation has roots in the past, preventive
interventions constitute in some measure attempts to remake history. Current
refugee flows in the former Soviet Union, for instance, arise in par from a
process of imperial disintegration with antecedents in earlier imperial policies
to forcibly relocate and incorporate peoples, The proeess is not new: when the
cumulative structures of imperial control crumble and new ones arise, refugee
flows have historically been a byproduct of the sorting out of peoples and
boundaries. Present refugees in the Commonwealth of Independent States are
in important ways "in bondage to history", to rephrase Tolstoy.
The challenge for policy is thus formidable, Even if appropriate instruments of
intervention can be identified and the consequences reasonably predieted,
sodal structures remain resistant to policy rnanipulation in the short run. At
best, perhaps, these analyses can provide waring about potentially explosive
situations. In the case of Rwanda, for instance, underlying causes of the 1994
crisis included a sharening of ethnic categorization, usually traced to the
colonial period. Demographie pressures were intense, and economIc
competition increased markedly in the 1980s, Had there been less ethnic
antagonisrn, more prosperity and less demographie pressures, the structural
preconditions for widespread violence no doubt would have been less
compellng. But modifying these variables would have required long-term
policies driven by the probability - but not certainty - of avoiding violent
conflct. Governments rarely behave in such a single-minded fashion, and the
decentralization of power in an international system based on competitive
nation-states makes it difficult to mount concerted action in this respect.
The limits imposed by the logic of science, history and policy have led critIcs
to question the relevance of preventive diplomacy and warn about its ilusory
or even counterproductive effects (Stedman 1995), The complexity of sodal
conflcts and the uncertain effects of intervention need not have a totally
paralyzing effect, however. In recent decades, some pro gress has been made
with respect to decolonization and dernocratization, in developing an
international human rights regime and providing internatÏonal economic
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assistance- all positive developments affecting the underlying causes of
conflct. There is also another approach.
To further develop preventive policies it is essentially to understand what they
can realistically be expected to deliver, and adjust the claims accordingly. From
a perspective of limiting the humanitarian consequences of social conflcts, the
case is increasingly being made for addressing the proximate, not the root
causes, in other words, to limit the violence against civilians. As Geoffrey Best
notes in his analysis of thedevelopment of the law of war, modifying wars (jus
in bello) is as important, if not more, as trying to preventing them (jus ad
bellum) (Best 1980). As we shall see in the next section, considerable efforts in
policy as been precisely to limit such violence, by various forms of "protective
presence" . This forms the context, and sometimes the essence, of humanitarian
practices to mitigate or prevent conflct.
By focusing on preventing violence, - rather than on conflct per se - policy
sidesteps to some degree the fundamental issues of peace versus social justices
that a preventive policy raises. As numerous analysts have noted, it is necessary
to be c1ear about precisely what so-called preventive policies are to prevent. A
policy designed to prevent "conflict" could easily disguise a policy wedded to
the status quo, or to the defence of one social order at the cost of another.
Given different concepts of social order and rights - differences that some
observers claim are increasing in the 1990s (Huntington 1993) - these are
unavoidable implications of a preventive policy.
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3 STRATEGI ES AND PRACTICES
The previous chapter outlned different schools of thoughts on the relationship
between humanitarian assistance and conflct, and the overall direction of this
debate in the aid community. This chapter seeks to systematize experience by
summarizing the "state-of-the ars" in the literature, and drawing on examples
from well-known cases. In a separate section (chap.4), experiences of
Norwegian NGOs wil be summarized.
3.1 The general "state of the arts"
The first point to be noted is that "the state of the ars" is poor. Arecent
meeting of British NGOs on programmng in situations of conflct (CODEP
1996) was typical: it emphasized that agency personneI lack the analytical tools
to make sense of the context in which they operate. Relevant areas of research
such as anthropology, conflct resolution studies, and political science have
followed divergent directions. Anthropologists have focused on the impact of
the availability of weapons (Fukui and Markaks 1994), or the disruption of
exchange (Hutehinson 1996). Political scientists have examined the macro-
social conditions for the emergence of sentiments of ethnic militance (e.g.
Anderson 1991, Gellner 1983). Conflct resolution experts whom NGOs have
called on for assistance have developed techniques related to mediation and
negotiation, but these are not directly relevant for programe targeting and
evaluation.
One approach selected by ageneies concerned to strengthen skils in conflict
situations is to develop manuals (e.g. Bade and Wiliams), mission reports and
evaluations. The main weakness of these documents is the weight of the
institutional constraints and agendas. This is particularly the case in the United
Nations, where only semi-academic bodies such as UNRISD (the War Torn
Societies Project) or UNIDIR (the Disarament and Conflct Resolution
Project) can produce forward-looking thinking. Similarly, the UN Emergency
Unit in Addis Ababa sought in lune 1995 to systematize the links between the
IGAD(D) process and the UN humanitarian programes (Borton, 1995, Draft
4). The paper recognizes that certain fonns of aid and conflct resolution are
highly compatible, but beyond emphasizíng the need for donor coordination,
does not formulate specific guidelines. The same applies to the OECD's
publication "The Challenge of Development Within Conflict Zones" (Mooney
1995); here we find only general or unspecific advice.
The full entranee of humanItarian organisations into theatres of war in the
1990s, as well as increased resources available, led some NGOs to refocus on
security and political aspects. NGOs operate in, or dose to, the conflct area,
of ten has prolonged presence, and engage various socia! segments. Yet, for
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Ireasons noted in the previous chapter, many humanitarian NGOs are reluctant
to embark on conflct prevention lmitigation activities. They recognize the
ethical dilemmas involved, and that reportng or negotiation may mean takng
sides which can jeopardize their primary concern to deliver humanitarian
services. Good theories on which to articulate a strategy are also lacking. Most
NGOs therefore approach conflct management with reservations. One result is
that the collective institutional memory of their experience, including "best
practices", is highly fragmented.
The main effort to systematize and evaluate the instItutional experience of the
UN and NGOs in the area of humanitarian assistance is the Humanitarianism
and War Project at the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at
Brown University, (USA). Their publication series established a trend and
remains a core, but focuses mainly on issues of effective delivery of services,
and does not systematize the intended or unintended political consequences
humanitarian assistance.
This chapter wil discuss institutional experience and strategies as they pertain
to four forms of humanItarian activities:
1. Provision of relief and related forms of humanitarian presence
2. Protected areas (non-military)
3. Human rights monitoring
4. Confidence-building measures
The first category is the most general, and wil include general discussion of
humanitarian presence when not further specified or cutting across categories.
The last three categories focus on paricular fonns of humanitarian presence.
This categorization represents a slight change from the original classification
proposed and restated in the ToR, viz: ((i) human rights monitoring, (ii)
medical assistance, inc1uding traditional Red Cross functions,
(ii)"conventional" humanitarian assIstance in emergencies (food and non-food
assistance), and (iv) confidence-building measures (inc1uding "peace-building
measures, informal mediation and contact facilItation). As the review of the
literature progressed, it became apparent that a traditional sector approach as
originally proposed was less useful than considering aid sectors from the point
of view of the resources they introduced into a society. The original proposal
also did not distinguish the specific notion of protected zones; however, this
represents an important form of humanÏtarian response, an was reinstated. The
last category was adjusted to exclude the general analysis of NGO activities in
conflct resolutIon work, paricularly negotiation and mediation. The literature
on this so-called second-track diplomacy has become so large that it was not
possible to give a fully summar of it within this limited review.
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3.2 Provision of relief and related forms of humanitarian
presenee
3.2. 1 Approaches
The collective experience of several US-based NGOs relating to humanitarian
assistance and conflict was recently discussed at a seminar o:rganized by the
U.S. Institute of Peace (Smock 1993). Given the complicated consequences of
humanitarian assistance, the seminar acted in the spirit of the "Do no Harm"
principle by identifying practical steps that NGOs can take to minimize or
eliminate the negative impact of aid:
. Closer dialogue with donors: NGOs function largelyas implementing
agents for donor governments and the UN. These donors are of ten not well
informed about field conditions and may impose unrealistic restrictions and
inappropriate mandates on NGOs that have negative consequences in the
field;
. Improved planning: While emergency situations usually do not permit time
for the requisite planning to avoid all negative consequences, more can be
done by improved planning that l) assesses needs more accurately, 2)
analyzes the consequences of agreements negotiated to gain access to needy
populations and obtain security for NGO personneI;
. Lang term impact: provide aid that wil have the longe st term benefit to
targeted groups and make empowerment of local institutions a high
priority;
. Human rights: deploy human rights monitors to help protect local
populations from exploitation and repression by the fighting factions;
. Coordinate closely with other aid organizations that operate in the same
conflct area;
. Evaluate: contract for independent monitoring and evaluation of assistance
programs to reduce mismanagement and the diversion of supplies.
Some of these steps are increasingly discussed as strategies that go beyond the
"Do No Har" principle and may have a positive mitigative/preventive effect
on the conflct.
Coordination~ In cases where the moral value of one party or the other in a
conflct is roughly equal, and where each pary holds the promise of some form
of stability and long term resolution, agencies and donors may readily disagree
on whom to support. In their strategy document for the US Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Prendergast and Scott (1996) concludes:
"It is pointless for OFDA to achieve Aid with Integrity if conflict is to be
inadvertently fuelled by other agencies or donors. In order to fully address the
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riskof aid sustaining conflict, all (third) paries need to improve co-ordination
at all leveIs. First donors need to address co-ordination between and among
themselves at national, regional and international leveIs. Second donors need to
improve their internal co-ordination between different government
deparments. However co-ordination is a concept approved by all but defined
by few... The notion of leadership is controversial, and many donors privately
admIt that co-ordination in the sense of loss of sovereignty is the last thing they
want" (Prendergast and Scott 1996: Item 4.10) .
Some writers (inc1uding Prendergast and Scott) recommend a strengthened
humanitarian core to the international system, such as the UN Deparment of
Humanitarian Affairs. However, even if there were a consensus on the need for
prevention and the means of caring it out, humanitarian norms remain
singularly undetermined as regards social justice, political solutions and
security priorities.
On the field level, however, there have been some successful cases of agency
coordination, such as the "Joint Policy of Operations" in Liberia (cpr.2.3.4).
Reviewing the humanitarian action in Liberia in the period 1989-94, Scott et.al
(1996) concludes that the humanitarian NGOs struggled valiantly to preserve
their independence of action from the political agendas of ECOMOG and the
UN in order to obtain access to all pars of the country. As the UN and
ECOMOG became associated with the Monrovia interim government in 1992-
93, the humanitarian NGOs tried to deliver aid also to the rebel held areas. In
the end, however, the agencies succumbed to political pressure and were forced
to end across-the-border deliveries from Cote dlvoire. The aid agencies were
torn between a desire to insulate themselves from the political proeess, and a
desire to make a direct contribution to peace. As a result, a joint strategy
eventually proved elusive.
Inclusive approach. The end of the Cold War faciltated the development of
more inc1usive approaches in delivering emergency assistance or rehabiltation
aid. Instead of external paries competitively seeking to support their respective
c1ients, there was now more political space for coordinating international
assistance to benefit the victims on all sides.
An ear1y case was Afghanistan, where UNOCA (established in 1988)
developed so called cross-border and cross-lines practices. Designed to bring
hurnanitarian aid to all the paries in the conflct by crossing (international)
borders as well as (political) lines, aid strategies were also deliberately used to
induce the various parties in a peace-related dialogues. Concepts such as
"humanitarian encirclement" (trucking in aid from all sides), and "zones of
tranquility (where aid was given on condition that the paries in a given area
cooperated), were developed. A subsequent evaluation of these practices was
generally positive (Donini 1996).
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Similarly, in Afghanistan, the ICRC worked on all sides of the conflict and
used this for bargaining purposes. A special route was used for deliveries, and
the paries to the conflct were informed that if this paricular road was
attacked, the ICRC could no longer assist the civilan populations. The road
was, in effect, made a non-combat zone.
Operation Lifeline Sudan has become a classic case of linking aid with peace
negotiations in an inc1usive approach, .and wil be discussed separately below
(3.2.2)
Multilateral institutions have become more open to working with non-state
actors of all kinds. Building on this, one close observer /activist proposes that
the UN Resident Co-ordinator promote a qualitatively different, non-elitist,
truly paricipatory and co-operative approach to aid, involving working with
non-governmental actors removed from the capitals and state structures (StiefeI
1994). This approach is also supported by key UNDP officials who advocate
new strategic allances (Cholmondeley 1995).
Participatory approach. ParalleI to the solidarity literature (cfr. 2.3.1.) a strand
of analysis was developing that called for aid agencies to build on the
paricipatory efforts and enterprise of the victims, rather than just replacing
them when delivering relief. An early and extreme formulation was lmposing
A id, by Barbara Harrell-Bond (1986), an anthropological analysis of refugee
relief in south Sudan. The approach certainly had implications for political
organizations and empowerment of the beneficiar population, which could
have the effect of increasing or decreasing the conflct, depending on the
inclinations and degree of empowerment of the local populations. These
dimensions were less discussed in the subsequent literature than the practical
possibilties of adopting a bottom-up strategy when delivering relief supplies,
especially to large numbers and in sudden emergencies. Instead, this approach
led into a second discussion that linked relief with development aid, or the so-
called contInuum debate.
The concept of a continuum between relief and development became
conventional wisdom in aid cIrcles in the early 1990s. Major issues were laid
out in Rising from the Ashes (Anderson and Woodrow 1989). Using
vulnerabilty analysis, the work leans on previous research on entitlements
(Amartya Sen 1981) to address issues of relief and reconstruction. It recognizes
the developmentalist concern regarding the negative effects of emergency aid,
but also the practical limits to applying alternative strategies. Two sets of
problems have been singled out in. this and related literature:
. there is a c1eavage in donor funding between capacity building activities -
which are placed in the development category and involve slow and
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. ,cumbersomedisbursements -, andsurvivalneeds and palliative activities -
whicharecategorized within the more versatile aid category.
. the imperative of timeliness in emergency operations is recognized, and the
related constraints on the use of local knowledge and consultation
proeesses.
The first of these problems is increasingly acknowledged by donor evaluations
and gradually remedied. The second appears insurmountable, especially when
agencies have to deploy rapidly in areas not covered by their institutional
memones.
Neutral approach. A neutral approach does not, of course, necessarily mitigate
or prevent conflct. However, as the c1assic humanitarian approach to confliet,
its implementation in practice should be noted. The claim of neutrality to
moderate conflct rests on the premise of access: the ICRC sees neutrality as
the best way of gaining access to all sides, and hence to mitigate the symptoms
of conflct in the largest possible area. In order to remain neutral, in turn, the
ICRC negotiates access with all sides, employs foreign delegates in central
positions, disassociates itself with other aid actors that are seen to be parisan,
inc1uding the UN (as in the ICRC did in the former Yugoslavia), and use
national Red Cross chapters only when these are seen as non-parisan (as
Somalia and Zaire). Letters passed on to and from prisoners that ICRC visit are
carefully censored for political content. The organization very rarely reports
public1y on human rights situations, bui relies on "quiet diplomacy".
A recurring problem for humanitarian organizations has been the political-
miltary activism of refugee populations they are called upon to assist. The
phenomenon of "refugee warriors" has beeri noted, and the possibilty that aid
to such camps serves to perpetuate violent conflct (cpr. 2.2). CIassic recent
cases are the Liberian refugees in the Cote dlvoire, the Khmer refugees in the
Thai-Cambodian border region, and the Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire.
The conventional approach to deal with such problems has been to attempt to
separate the "refugees" from the "warriors", and thus "neutralize" the
phenomenon, and to move refugee camps away from the border. Where
possible, this is UNHCR practice, which is grounded in international refugee
law.
3.2.2 Preventive Strateg/es
Preventive Protection. The term was temporarily used by UNHCR in the
former Yugoslavia to mean protection "in pace" through presenee and the
provision of humanitarian relief, thereby makng conventional asylum less
needed. The concept has since been heavily criticized and the term is no longer
used by UNHCR.
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Detailedcriticisrn is providedbyMooney(1995), who concludes that
protectionthroughpresence in the former Yugoslavia was a myth perpetuated
by potential countries of asylum which did not wish to receive refugees. Using
reports by Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
and others, Mooney finds that protection was undermined by lack of access,
and the limited mandate of UNPROFOR, as well as dubious neutrality of some
troop contingents.
One dilemma posed by "preventiveprotection;' in the former Yugoslavia was
whether or not aid agencies should pre-empt violence by facilitating migration
to ethnically more homogeneous areas. Some, like the Danish Refugee Council,
found that blocking or revers ing ethnic cleansing was not a practical
proposition on the ground, given the means available. As aresult, humanitarian
agencies went beyond their normal reactive fole to facilitate displacement, and
sometimes allowed evacuation of civilans. While heavily criticised by local
authorities and media, the strategy did help to prevent further violence.
As for protection through moral suasion and witnessing, accounts are likewise
fragmentar. There are many examples of pre-emptive measures taken by aid
workers that would not have been possible in their absence, e.g. takng
individuals into an office compound who otherwise would have been
maltreated or killed, or negotiating with attackers. There are also many other
examples of faIled protection, such as the killng of Christian cIvilians in the
Kurdish Safe Haven in Iraq at the height of the international presenee there in
lune 1991.
Prevention as a function of provision of resources. If conflct is a rational
choice in the face of dwindling resources or a shrinking opportunity structure,
aid can have a substantial impact. As providers of resources in aresource
scarce environment, humanitarian agencies/organizations often exercise an
influence quite out of proportion with their normal profile on the international
scene. At times, NGOs become virtual shadow administrations on the local
leve!, as in post-w ar Mozambique (Costy 1996). Dispensing numerous benefits,
the NGOs can make local authorities and other groups cooperate (de Waal
1994). Three mechanisms are paricularly important from a conflict
management perspective:
. provide alternative channels for conflct-oriented leaders, (ex-)soldiers and
militia
. support moderating distributive institutions
. reduce resource scarcities in conf1ct areas.
Alternative channeis. One controversial approach is to assist soldiers/militia in
refugee camps (Le. "the warrior" component). Thus, some NGOs gave food
and medial supplies to the former Rwanda Army camps in Zaire in 1994-6.
Apar from the value of aiding the non-combatant familes in the camps, the
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main purpose was to pre-empt predatory raids from these camps into the towns
and other camps. The strategy consequently served to reduce violence in the
area, at least in the short run.
Simple forms of assistance can help to redirect the energies of militants
towards constructive ends, e.g. by providing benefits during negotiations (such
as paying for travels to Ethiopia for Somali politicians in 1993). This leverage
is of course mostly used in negotiations concerning access and the safety of
staff and premises. The ICRC has effectively used this approach.
After the conflet, demobilzation programs are major avenues for providing
new incentives and opportunities to ex-so1diers and the militia, and several
internationally aided programs have been undertaken in the 1990s (Berdal
1996).
Aid agencies/organizations can influence the perception of risks and
opportunities among the paries by withholding aid supplies. Relief ageneies in
Liberia, for example, decided in 1996 to suspend all but the most urgent
programres to protest against the manipulation of aid, and apply pressure on
the paries to enforce humanitarian norms. The danger of using food and other
basics as a "carrot" , of course, is that it opens for general and reciprocal
manipulation of emergency aid. Hence, many agencies/organizations were
suspicious of the aims of the UN Special Representative Mohamed Sahnoun in
Somalia, who repeatedly trÏed to blackmail and coopt diffcult leaders with aid
delivery. UN humanitarian offcials perceived this as dangerous, especially
after the deployment of UNIT AF at the end of 1992.
Moderating distributive institutions. There has historically been a clear
perception among aid agencies and governments of the importance of
controlling relief supplies as a means to influence a given population. After
Wodd War TI, for instance, this was a major debate around the establishment of
the UN Relief and Rehabiltation agency. More recently, work on conflct
prevention seeks to identify, or deve1op, administrative capacities that can work
with international third parties to have a moderating influence on the conflct
through the distribution of relIef resources. This has been argued by e.g.
Hizkias Assefa (1993) of the Nairobi Peace, and is a principal tools of conflct
reso1ution used by NGOs such as Concilation Resources in England. It also
advocated by organisations concerned to strengthen administrative structures
after the emergency, and reflected in works such as Macrae and Zwi's War and
Hunger (1994) .FaIlure to identify and develop such structures in the Kurdish
northern Iraq between 1991 and 1995 was possibly one of the most significant
"opportunities mIssed" from the perspective of preventing further conflct
(Keen 1995).
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Resourcescarcities in conflictareas. Simplystated, the axiom here is that the
more supplies are brought in, in the best possible way, the less suffering, grief
and desire for revenge, and the easier it wil be to enter a process of
reconciliation.
The principle has been followed for example by Save the Children in Somalia.
Assuming that conflcts often originate in disputes over grazing rights and
water, the SC has designed its water driling and water collection programmes
to reduce the opportunities for the conflct among different dans and sub-dans.
A limitation in this respect is that emergency aid is of ten only partially
effective in reducing mortality and morbidity, and the impact is very difficult to
discern, even for the aid workers on the ground themselves.
Assuming that relative deprivation among groups is an important source of
conflct, another potential preventive measure is to reduce such differences.
Although the rationale is not conflct prevention, many NGO restoeking
programres in south Sudan are probably playing that role. Large scale raids
from the Nuer areas into some of the Dinka territory in 1991 had drastically
reduced the availabilty of cattle among the Dinkas. Gradual replenishment of
the herds is a direct dissuasion from more violent forms of repossession. Other
examples of such aid is to reconnect services or roads to recently or suddenly
deprived communities.
Prevention as a function of the delivery process. The connections between the
proeess of delivering emergency aid and promoting peace have been examined
in detail in what has become a classic case: Operation Lifeline Sudan. In an
early assessment, the collective authors of Humanitarianism Under Siege
(Minear et aL. 1991) note:
"Many who had hoped and expected that Lifeline would bring peace are
sharly critical of it for having failed to do sa. They acknowledge that Lifeline
succeeded in reducing hostilties for a time and in facilitating the safe passage
of relIef supplies. However, after a few short months, the waring paries were
baek at their bloody stmggle, fortified by the reprieve LifelIne had provided.
Whatever short-term tranquillty Lifeline may have afforded, it left untouched
the roots of the eonflct " (p.125).
LifelIne's particular historie breakthrough was, for the authors, the negotiation
of corridors of tranquility for relief deliveries. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)
officials built on the agreements reaehed with one side in the eonflct to entIce
the other into concessions. The Operation encouraged dialogue, and this was
seen as a direct contribution to the peace process. It also made the civilan
impact of the war visible, shamng decision makers towards peace. The fact
that the corridors were respected only for a few months was not seen as
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inherent to the process,but ratherdue to the lack of external political support to
thecommitments madein OLS.
OLS highlights three different contributions which aid can make to a peace
proeess. Lifeline provided super-ordinate goals (a reminder of the common
normative grounds for peace), it promoted communication between opp os ing
parties, and gave additional legitimacy to both paries while creating some
hopes for peace. This threefold influence was the example of humanitarian
diplomacy which inspired later relief officiaIs, inc1uding Jan Eliasson (while
head of the UN-DHA) and James Grant (while head of UNICEF), to see relief
efforts as an instrument of peace in socalled humanitarian diplomacy.
The window of opportunity provided by the period of direct negotiation
between the two sides was in fact rapidly c1osed. The experience of relief
workers, after the period in which the OLS study was written, was that even
when proximity talks were arranged between the paries by OLS, these allowed
the diplomatic staging of militar manoeuvres, rather than creating the
premises of a growing common ground (a view endorsed notably by Alex de
Waal). On the ground, the humanitarian agencies struggled to keep open access
to areas in need against overwhelming natural and man-made obstac1es.
However Operation Lifeline survived for many more years, having relinquished
its role as a peace-maker, and concentrating instead on the delivery of supplies.
It continues to give donOfs discrete leverage on the parties to the conflct: high
visibilty flghts into the area, and the abilty to deliver (or not deliver) material
aid to specific populations confers considerable power on the donors.
This persuasive role of emergency aid has been underscored in a different
context by Randolph Kent, fonner UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Rwanda.
Examining the critIcal transition in 1995, Kent conc1udes that a main problem
was the inabilty of aid actors to reach a consensus with the Government on
humanitarian objectives:
"There might have been a greater chance to reconcile the positions of both
sides had the government been more convinced that the international
community was indeed responsive to its needs... The type of assistance that was
required did not fit in to the conventional categories of either relief or
development. The situation in Rwanda demanded greater risks and greater
imagination than the international community felt wiling to give. Resources to
stabilse the military, to recreate the police force, to build prisons and to rebuild
the justice system were essential but few donors were initially wiling to accept
the domestie political consequences of such assistance. And when some did,
the procedures for providing such assistance were all too slow and
cumbersome... It was difficult to engage a government that felt more and more
that words rather than action were the net result of efforts of accomodation".
(Kent 1996: 79-80).
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In this case, the donors were in principle committed to give aid in support of
reconcilation,and hence renewed massacres in the country. This failed in large
part due to the inadequacy of the sectoral definition of aid.
3.3 (Non-miltary) protected areas
Protection of a place or population can be achieved with different forms of
power. The classic categories of power in political sociology are:
. normative ( based by invoking norms, reason or symbols, the power of
witnessing
. utilitarian (based on rendering or withholding material goods/services)
. coercive (based on physical force).
Of these, the first two are of most interest here since they constitute the
principal source of power of NGOs to influence the course of a conflict in the
field.
Protected areas in or near the theatre of war represent a moderation of the
symptoms of conflict in the sense of mitigating the violence. Such areas thus
affect the proximate causes of flght and suffering rather than the underlying
ones. As such, they are a modest but long-standing response of the international
humanitarian communïty to war.
There are basically two kinds: protected zones designed to be enforced with
militar force; and those that are not. The former kind has received increased
attention in the 1990s as the UN increasingly mandated the militar
enforcement of protected zones, e.g. in northern Iraq, southwestern Rwanda
and various pars of the former Yugoslavia. The latter is the c1assic Red Cross
area, grounded in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Our primar concern here is
with non-military protected areas.
3.3. 1. Red Cross protection
The International Red Cross movement has been supporting the gradual
elaboration of the law and practice of restraining the impact of war on
personnes hors de combat and non-combatants. By implication, this also
involved astrong preventive fole (Grunewald 1995). The independence and
neutrality of the ICRC organisation, anchored in Swiss concepts of "active
neutrality", led its leaders to promote international law to cover the largest
possible number of cIvilans. This included the establishment of "safe zones",
originally conceived during World War n, to provide a refuge from bombings
to urban population. It also drew from ICRC's experience in the Spanish Civil
War, where written agreements were obtained from both sides to respect the
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GenevaConventions, to develop a code for internal conflcts. The early stages
of these developments have been analyzed in a book on the Palestinian conflict
the 1945-1952 period(Dominique-D. Junod 1996).
The ICRC has done considerable work to systematize the Red Cross experience
with protected zones in this century. A paricularly useful summar of the
conditions and characteristics of safe zones has recently been done by Yves
Sandoz (1995). He gives a brief overview of the historical context in which
today's debate on "safe zones" should. be placed. .In modern times, the
establishment of safe or protected zones goes back to a proposal made by Hemi
Dunant in 1870. There were several different proposals on the issue in the
following years, all of them leading up to the codification of safe zones in the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Although formal ly established in the
Geneva Conventions, the possibility of creating safe or neutral zones have
rarely been used during conflct. In 1977, an additional protocol to the Fourth
Convention supplemented the neutralized zones (artic1e 15) with two other
types of protected zone: the non-defended localities (aric1e 59 of the additional
protocol of 1977) and demilitarized zones (aricle 60). These are meant to
provide protection from hostilities for the entire population that is not involved
in such hostilties.Corrmon for all the various forms ofprotected zones is the
fact that they provide protection for civilians, not combatants.
From the early 1990s onward, the emergence of a new type of protected zone:
"safe havens" or "security zones" has been seen: in Northern Iraq in 1991; in
the conflcts in former Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards. The creation of these
zones was only made possible under international rnlItar protection, this
makes them very different from the traditional neutral or safe zones. The fact
that the Iraqi operation was imposed upon the Iraqi authorities also differs with
traditional procedures and the framework of international humanitarian law. In
the case of the conflets in former Yugoslavia, the picture is very complex, and
Sandoz gives examples of "classic" protected (or neutralized) zones (hospitals)
as well as "protected zones" in its broader thinking. In former Yugoslavia,
ICRC could not assume responsibilty for sueh zones itself, due to the nature of
the conflct, and international troops should therefore ensure the safety of the
zones. The "classic" protected zones are meant to give shelter to the population
not involved in hostilities, thus fulfiling a central objective of international
humanitarian law. When it comes to the use of force to secure azone, Sandoz
concludes that "if force is used it must also be in relation with an attempt to
solve the problems that have given rise to the conflct" (Sandoz 1995: 925).
The Re emblem has a symbolie power that provides protection to its personneI
and to the people given help. This is a commonly made assumption. The
question why the emblem is provïding an effective and actual protectîon is
however not readily answered. Histodcally, the adoption of one distinctive sign
was from the very beginning seen as a prerequisite for the inviolability of
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medicalservices, ambulances and personneL. However, the ICRC has long been
concerned bytheproblems (real as well aspotential) caused by the current
multiplicity of emblems 'within the Movement. In 1977, a working group was
set up to study the matter, but in 1981 it was dissolved without having reached
agreement on'any specific proposal.
A volume of the Movements own periodical, International Review of the Red
Cross no. 272, Sandoz 1989: "The red cross and red crescent emblems", was
fully dedicated to questions relating to the meaning and use of the emblem. In
an aric1e here, Francois Bugnion sees the main problems caused by the
coexistence of two emblems to be as follows:
1. that it implies a preferential treatment in favour of Christian an Muslim
countries over other religions
2. that it is at odds with the principle of unit y
3. that it undermnes universality
4. that it is an invitation to further split (despite the 1929 decision that no new
emblems would hereafter be recognized)
5. that it causes problems in countries where different religious communities
live together
6. that it undermines their protective force (Bugnion 1989)
Yves Sandoz presents some reflections on the issue in an aric1e from the same
volume of IRRe. He sees two issues to be the main problems: the improper use
of the emblem, and the problem of maintaining religious neutrality. As he
points out, mIsuse of the emblem is a corollar of its symbolie power. The
question is how misuse can be avoided.
The President of the ICRC, Comelio Sommarga, has in a later aricle (IRRC
no. 289, July 1992) discussed the "unit y and plurality of the emblems" ,
stressing the importanee of securing absolute respect for the emblems. Re
c1aimed that the protective power of the emblem is threatened by two factors;
abuses of the emblem, and its plurality. That the use of two emblems is a
problem, not only due to the signs' religious connotations, is linked to the fact
that the unit y of the distinctive sign is a major factor in providing its protective
force. Also "the objective of unit y of the distinctive sign, which symbolizes
selfless help for all who suffer, is a corollar of the basic ideals of the
Movement". Re further pointed to the danger of the signs being perceived as
religious symbols, in this way they wil no longer be seen as neutral, and thus
"there is a great danger of becoming a target". Sommarga wanted with this
aricle to launch a debate on future strategies and solutions to the problems
related to the plurality of the emblem. The annual reports of ICRC as well as
their newssheets list some experiences, and mentions the lack of knowledge of
the Geneva Conventions with the waring pars as a major problem. Rowever,
no thorough evaluation of which factors that may cause disrespect for and
attacks on Red Cross personneI has been undertaken.
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More generally, the "humanitariandiplomacy" of the ICRC by such means as
dissemination of humanitarian principles, visits to offcials and prisons, and
presence in sensitive places has been analyzed by Berger (1996), and in a
seminal work by David Forsythe (1977).
Practically all complex emergencies have given birth to discussions on the
creation of safe zones inspired by the Geneva concept (such as Operation
Lifeline Sudan in 1992), few (non-military) have been implemented, and the
record has been mixed In Sri Lanka, the Open Relief Centres (ORC)
established by UNHCR succeeded in building de facto protected zones around
relief areas. The reasons for the success of the ORCs are generally recognized
(UNHCR 1993, Claranee 1991), and point to three critical pre-conditions:
. they were demilitarized
. they served the humanitarian interests of both paries to the conflict
. they were established with the consent of both paries
3.3.2 Other "safe zones
Several safe zones which were established in theatres of conflct in the 1990s
(notably in the former Yugoslavia and Northern Iraq) represent a departure
from the Geneva legal framework in that they were established without the
consent of the paries. There is a substantialliterature on these zones, mainly in
relation to international peace-keeping, and only some aspects concern us here.
The "protected zone" in Northem Iraq is of paricular interest because it was
established with militar force, and retained a protective military umbrella, but
international ground presence after 1991 consisted exclusively of humanitarian
workers and "UN guards". This non-militar presenee was effectively given a
major protection role, but appears to have had liule impact: the effective
protection which was provided depended basically on the wilingness of
external powers to use militar force. As a UNHCR analyst concludes, the case
ilustrates the limits as to how much can be loaded on to the doctrine that
"humanitarian presence" has arestraining effect on the parties to the conflct
(Morris, The Limits of Mercy, 1995). Another UNHCR officials adds that basic
rules of staff training and appropriate resourcing were not observed, thus
aggravating the consequences of the faIlure to provide asylum elsewhere
(Landgren 1995).
Safe areas are particularly difficult to maintain when state structures fragment,
as happens in many complex emergencies. These are "destructured conflcts",
in ICRC jargon, or "failed states" in academic j argon. The experience of
several humanitarian organizations during the emergency in Somalia, when
they succeeded only intermittently in maintain safe corridors or safe areas in
their core area of operations, ilustrate these problems. All social "spaee"
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becameheavilypoliticised, thereby complicating humanitarian access. As for
the ability of the humanitarian organizations in mitigating and preventing
further violence, the conc1usion of one major study sponsored by Actionaid
(Farah and Lewis 1993), is that it requires separate and deliberate strategies of
reconciliation. These must start by recognizing certain "givens" in the situation,
notably the limited and diffuse authority of the elders, the existence of
freelance militias, and local conventions of protocol that require long time-
horizons. Similar conc1usions emerged from the experience of the Swedish Life
and Peace Institute (Horn of Africa Bulletin 1996).
3.4 Human rights promotion and monitoring:
Three human rights dimensions are relevant for this review: a) human rights
reporting as an instrument of warning of humanitarian crises, b) human rights
monitoring as an instrument of deterrence against individual abuse, and c)
human rights education as conflct preventive measures.
Numerous organizations and agencies are engaged human rights promotion as
preventive activity. Also traditional humanitarian organizations have branched
out in this direction, as the ICRC ilustrates. In the former Yugoslavia, for
instance, the ICRC has a two-year program educational program in
international humanitarian law and human rights. In several conflct situations,
the organization works with the parties to the conflct to enhance knowledge of
human rights and the Geneva Conventions governing the conduct of war, often
using local cultural and historie al reference points in the educational message
(as recently in Sudan, Somalia and Burundi) (For current information, see
ICRe Update, Geneva/temet). The preventive effeet of such
edueationalpromotional activities are diffeult to determine in any precise
manner, but must be presumed to be positive, and, at least, is not harmful, thus
complying with the minimalist "do no har" principle.
Most humanItarian NGOs have traditionally be reluctant to engage in human
rights monitoring, which is seen as secondary and possibly conflctual with
their main mission (DeMars 1995). An increased interest in the early warning
of impending crises has caused some rethinking on this point, especially after
recent events in Somalia and Rwanda. Some NGOs, such as MSF International
(the common secretariat of the three main MSF organisations), have explored
the possibilty of working with Amnesty by discretely providing information on
human rights violations. Oxfam has formulated a pragmatic version of this
approach:
"Some humanitarian agencies may be in a position to initiate or become
actively involved in amediation process. Others may see their role more in
terms of human rights issues than humanitarian relief. In extreme
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circumstances, some NGOs may prefer to dose down their field operations in
order to be ableto denouncesituations in which they feel powerless to be of
effective help at an operational leve!.. It may be decided that, if it is not al ready
doing so, Oxfam should support the work of specialist human rights agencies
as par of a comprehensive response to the situation, especially in situations
where humanitarian work and aid workers become the targets of attack and
repression" (Eade and Wiliams 1995: 858).
The decision-makng process wil naturally have to involve headquarers and
field personneI, and is of ten difficult. Thus, the ICRC decided to walk a middle
ground between denouncing and informing the outside world about the killngs
in Rwanda in April-July 1994, thereby seeking to continue its presence on the
ground, yet using the media to call attention to the events.
While human rights monitoring may serve to mitigate or deter violence, donors
appear to some agencies/organizations as less interested in supporting
monitoring than in financing relief. This was the experience of Save the
Children Allance and UNICEF when considering ways of enforcing the rights
of children during complex emergencies (cpr. intern al discussion notes). The
SCA also found that a traditional human rights reporting role distracted from
more traditional relief work, and could strain relations with local authorities.
The organizations which form par of the Save the Children Allance have
recently gone through an intemal exercise to ensure that their relief
programrnes do not come to contradiet their child protection fole.
Moving in the other directions from human rights monitoring to humanitarian
aid is the London-based human rights NGO, African Rights. In an unusual
programme in the Nuba mountains of Sudan, the organization uses an
extensive network of local informants who are supported with humanItarian
aid. This system works on the basis of a parisan approach to the conflct and
cannot serve as a model for the UN and other agencies that aspire to neutrality
and impariality.
3.4.1 Human rights moniforing in UN field operations.
Untii recently, most UN efforts to monitor human rights abuses consisted of the
rapporteur system established by the Commission on Human Rights. This
situation changed in the 1990s. Human rights monitoring contingents were
included in UN peacekeeping operatïons in El Salvador and Cambodia, a
monitoring mission was sent to Haiti, the former Yugoslavia and Guatemala,
and the first field operation of UN High Commssioner for Human Rights,
established in 1994, to ok place in Rwanda. (Gaer 1996). Of these, the
monitoring operations in El Salvador, Cambodia and Rwanda have recently
been evaluated , and wil be considered in paricular here.
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Human Rights Watch have analyzed the UNfieldoperations in El Salvador,
.'Cambodia,the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Iraq(Human Rights Watch
(1993). Human Rights and UN Field Operations),
In Peace-keeping and Human Rights (1994) International Amnesty (AI)
analyzed the effect of UN peace-keeping operations on human rights conditons
generally in El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, West Sahara, Angola,
Mozambique and Liberia. AI also presented a 15-Point Program for
Implementing Human Rights in International Peace Keeping Operations.
AI found UN operations in El Salvador and Cambodia to be the most
successful. UN human rights officers are considered to have had significant
mitigative and deterring effects.
"Their work has resulted in the release of detainees and the improvement of
prison conditions. They have made important contributions to the legislative
and institutional reform of the legal order for improving the protection of
human rights in accordance with international standards and raising public
awareness of human rights issues, inc1uding through education programs.
Amnesty International considers that the relative success of these operations
can be at least partly attributed to the serious, open and accountable procedures
of the human rights divisions" (p. 22).
Another reason for the relatively successes in El Salvador and Cambodia,
according to AI, is that the respective peace agreement specified which human
rights the paries were obligated to guarantee, as well as international
verification mechanisms to ensure their compliance. AI recommended that
similar clauses should be included in all peace agreements.
Civilan human rights observers with a special investigative mandate also have
an important role in preventing human rights violations, the report conc1udes.
South Africa and El Salvador are examples on this. But mere presence of the
UN is not sufficient. In Iraq, for example the UN humanitarian program did not
have a mandate that directly addressed the human rights issues. The presence of
UN security guards in northem Iraq did done little to change the pattern of
human rights repression, nor did it produee public information about what the
guards may have witnessed.
In Human Rights and UN Field Operations (1993) Human Rights Watch
examined five of the largest UN field operations in resent years; El Salvador,
Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Iraq, and concluded that with
the exception of El Salvador, the operations have assigned low priority to
human rights.
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In . El Salvador, ,. human rights. played a central role in the UN sponsored peace
process. A large number of UN human rights monitors were deployed in the
field six months before thepeace treaty was signed so as to deter abuses and
bu ild a climate of confidence on both sides of the conflct. The monitoring
continued after the peace accords were signed, and a commssion was
appointed to provide an offcial accounting of the abuses of the prior twelve
years. While problems remained, Human Rights Watch found that the
prospects for a lasting peace were better in El Salvador than in any of the other
countries analyzed, and that the prominent role given to human rights was an
important reason why.
In Cambodia, the UN mission was mandated to establish a neutral political
environment for the elections prescribed in the 1991 peace accords. Yet, fearful
of jeopardizing the elections, the UN adopted a cautious approach to human
rights violations, the report maintains. In the former Yugoslavia, the UN
initially gave little political or financial support to investigate and prosecute
war criminals. A Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia, appointed by
the UN Human Rights Commission, pursued his mandate aggressively,
insisting on the relationship between human rights, regional security and
humanitarian issues, but was ignored by those with the authority over UN
operations in field.
In the UN operations in Somalia, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, the UN
focused on the logistical problems of delivering relief supplies, and not on
human rights abuses, according to Human Rights Watch. In Somalia, the UN
made no effort to document the atrocities attributable to the warlords, to
establish tribunals to try them, or to exclude them from a role in Somalia's
future. In Iraq, the Security Council established a safe haven and a no-fly zone
in northern Iraq in 1991, but took a much less aggressive posture within the
borders of Iraq. The lack of UN presenee on the ground in Iraq allowed serious
human rights abuses.
The above evaluations were undertaken by NGOs with an organizational
mandate to promote human rights. Hence, a systematie bias may have affected
their conclusions. In the case of Rwanda, the evaluation of the UN-supervised
human rights field operations was imdertaken by independent scholars.
Covering the early phase of the operation, the assessment was extremely
critical, highlighting poor training and performanee of the monitors, and
suggested the overall impact was negative (Joint Evaluation, voL. IV, 1996).
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3. 5Confidence buildingmeasures
Supporting local norms conducive to conflict regulation. Most humanitarian
NGOs are reluctant to become involved in an explicitly political negotiation
process, which they fear may undermine their primar mission. However, many
see themselves as agents of change and educators (Mikkel sen 1995), and are
prepared to operate on the civil leve! of action - I.e. in civil society - as distinct
from whàt has been called the constitutionalleve1 of conflct resolution (Adams
and Bradbury 1995).
One important area of work concerns collective memories. Efforts are made to
select themes that are conducive to regulate conflct and prevent further
violence, e.g. naratives of common historical experiences and symbols. This
applies also to reconstruction of towns and cities after war and the
establishment of monuments to the past. As Tunbridge and Ashworth point out
(1996): "... we wil never again look at a monument or exhibit without posing
not only the 'whose heritage is this'? question, but also the insistent who is
disinherited here and what are the consequences of such dispossession?"
Because of the sensitive and complicated issues involved in " rewriting history
books", as UNESCO's Federico Mayor has noted, many aid NGOs have stayed
out of this area. UNESCO has faced is squarely through its Culture for Peace
programes, which seek to highIight those strands in a tradition that transcend
rather than reinforce conflct. In an initiative designed for Operation Lifeline
Sudan in 1995, for instance, UNICEF proposed
"a programme promoting awareness of and adherenee to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and other international conventions relevant to children
in war, as well as internationally recognised principles governing humanitarian
assistance, such as neutrality, impartiality and accountabilty. A key strategy is
to link these with traditional Sudanese values, which clearly seek to protect
children and civilans in crisis, and to encourage the Sudanese to take a lead
role in promoting humanitarian principles" (Consolidated Appeal 1995/1996,
p.26).
In a related area, the importance of disseminating information that counteracts
fear and hate propaganda has been increasingly recognized, especially after the
conflcts in Rwanda and Bosnia (Article 19 1996). The effort of organisations
like Reporters Sans Frontieres in the Great Lakes region and the Balkans is a
prototype of this form of action.
Aid organizations that work on both sides of the conflct often c1aim that this
helps to reestablish community and commercial links, which in turn increase
contacts and build confidence across political lines. In arecent review,
Prendergast (1996: 212) views trus form of humanitarian aid as an important
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contribution to "frontline ,diplomacy", and cites as examples Sudan, the
Ethiopia/Somalia/Somaliand border area, and Rwanda/Zaire. The problem, of
course, is that community and commercial exchanges often coexist with
paraBel patterns of continued violence (as noticed e.g. in Afghanistan and on
the Zaire/Rwanda border), hence the preventive or confidence bu ilding impact
of new exchanges is diffcult to assess.
Providing channels of negotiation.Most humanitarian NGOs do not engage in
formal mediation work. Yet opportunities to do so are considerable given their
wide contacts on the community level, and growing transfer of donor resources
to conflct prevention from other sectors (e.g. in the Finnish aid program).
Oxfam, in an institutional learning exercise, defined its role in conflct
prevention as conflct resolution at the grass roots level (Oxfam's Work in
Conflict Situations, report prepared by Rebecca Buell, 1996). Other NGOs see
themselves as a platform on which conflct resolution can begin, e.g. by
building commttee-like structures which are primarily intended to resolve
technical and sectoral issues, but faciltate informal preliminar contacts
between hostile paries. An umbrella organization of humanitarian/
development NGOs in Sri Lanka has moved in this direction (CMI 1996).
Some humanItarian NGOs recognize their lack of expertise in mediation and
are developing awareness or skils in conflct regulation. CARE International,
for example, held a regional workshop for conflct resolution in Nairobi in
J anuar 1996. The aim was not so much to develop a conflct resolution
capacity in an organisation which sees itself as a relief and development body,
but, more modestly, to heighten awareness among staff that their work holds a
significant potential in this area.
Confessional institutions (notably the Communïty of St. Egidio) and NGOs
who see mediation as their primar mission have moved aggressively into
"second-track diplomacy". As noted above, a substantial literature and
institutional experiences have accumulated in this area, which Hes beyond the
scope of this review.
Creating super-ordinate goals. The term is drawn from the work of Stephen
Ryan (1995) on resolving ethnic conflcts and refers to the introduction of
common aims that transcend the conflcting interests of the parties concerned.
By working together to achieve a common aim, pattems of cooperation and
mutual confidenee wil be generated that serve to overcome the original
conflct. This, at least, is posited by the socalled functionalist theory of
co operative integration developed in sociology and political science.
Consciously or not, the theory has been adopted by several humanitarian NGOs
that work in post-war rehabilitationlreconstruction phases. The prototype,
perhaps, is a project in Rwanda for multi-ethnic brick-making to rebuild houses
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that were destroyed in theethnic violence in 1994. Several Norwegian NGOs
have similar projects (see chap 4). Others have been described in relation to
repatriation of refugees during ongoing conflct (Cuny and Stein 1989).The
socalled Quick Impact Projects, first developed by UNHCR with local NGOs
in Nicaragua, similarly sought to fostered cooperation by involving both parties
within the local communities.
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4THE INFLUENCE OF HUMANITARIAN
PRESENCE: EXPERIENCES OF NORWEGIAN
NGOS
This section seeks to systematize some aspects of the experience of Norwegian
NGOs with respect to the consequences, inc1uding the mitigative and
preventive effects, of humanitarian presence. The analysis is based on
interviews with the NGOs, hence it records experiences. as perceived by the
NGOs themselves. It is therefore not a complete analysis, but only taps the
component known as "institutional memory" .
The following were interviewed: Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy
and Human Rights (NORDEM) which is primarily engaged in democracy or
peace building activities, and the five principal humanitarian NGOs:
Norwegian Red Cross (NRC), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Norwegian
Peoples Aid (NPA) , Norwegian Save the Children (NSC), the Norwegian
Refugee Council (NRC).
4. 1 Human Rights Monitoring
Human rights monitoring is a relatively recent activity that expanded when the
Cold War ended. Monitoring is an important part of the broader proeess of
promotïng human rights. In this report, election monitoring is treated as a sub-
set of human rights monitoring activities. All the Norwegian NGOs
interviewed carr out some monitoring activities, but the emphasis varies in
accordance with organizational objectives.
4. 1. 1 NORDEM
NORDEM seeks to prornote democracy and human rights by seconding
Norwegian personneI to situations where their expertise is relevant and needed.
Human rights monitoring, and election assistance and observation, constitute
over 90% of NORDEM's workload. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MF A) is the main channel for NORDEM missions which also include
assistance from the other governments, the UN, and other and intematïonal and
regional organizations. The idea to establish a Norwegian re source bank for
democracy and human rights was conceived in 1991, after an OSCE seminar on
democratization and institution building pointed to increased needs for
assistanee in this area.
In human rights monitoring, NORDEM has found it important to maintain a
positve dialogue with the respective national authorities in order to have a
long-term impact. To enter into a dialogue do es not exc1ude using certain kinds
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of political pressure. Human rights monitoring typically conflcts, however,
with' national sovereignty, hence it is important that national authorities are
consulted and take par in formulating a plan for improving the human rights
situation in the country.
The sec ond objective of human rights work is to survey national needs.
Monitoring is necessary to identify needs, and, if dealt with constructively, may
lead to the establishment of human rights institutions. Observation of police
violence, for instance, can)ead to the development of educational measures for
the police force in human rights questions. Institution building involves
education and counselling as well as practical and material assistance.
NORDEM personneI has, for instance, participated in seminars, debates etc. to
give advice on constitutional amendments (South Africa), electoral training,
registration of data, assessment of judicial systems etc. These are generally
low-cost projects (100 - 200000 NOK).
NORDEM finds that a general problem in human rights work is the lack of
coherent methods. As of today, no uniform manual exists for field operations.
In this respect, human rights monitoring is lagging far behind election
monitoring, which is well ahead when it comes to co-ordination and coherence
of methods. The problem of manuals can not easily be sol ved, as there are
several different international agencies involved in human rights monitoring
field operations. The main ones are the UN Deparment of Political AffairslUN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (responsible for human rights
operations in Haiti, Cambodia, Guatemala, El Salvador), OSCE (responsible
for Human rights work in former Yugoslavia) and UNHCHR (responsible in
Rwanda).
In 1995, the training for NORDEM personneI was a 3-days seminar. This was
extended in 1996 to a 4-5 days training session. The training focuses on a
comprehensive understanding of human. rights field operations; identification
of actors and interests, the UN system, methods, means, objectivïty. NORDEM
is at present working on a proposal for methods and approaehes which is
scheduled to be completed in J anuary 1997.
In November 1996, ameeting was held in Dublin, with delegates from IGOs,
NGOs and INGOs which recognized the need for coordination and uniform
objectives in human rights work The meeting concluded with a "statement of
needs" that underlined the importanee of offcIal evaluations of human rights
field operations (Dublin Round Table on the Promotion of the Rule of Law
through Effective Training for Human Rights Field Tasks, 28-29 November
1996).
When it comes to investigating human rights violations, there are no problems
related to manuals. NORDEM is using the established UN manual for this type
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of work. At present, there arethree NORDEM investigators in Bosnia and five
in Rwanda.
4.1.2 The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
The NRC has a large civilian stand-by force with human rights work as its
main activity (this force co-operates with NORDEM). The stand-by forces
inc1ude investigators, observers and analysts in human rights work and are used
by various UN agencies. Human rights, assistance, is closely related to election
monitoring, where human rights work often is undertaken prior to the elections.
In Cambodia, for instance, observers provided through the NRC observed the
electoral proeess for 14 months ahead of the elections themselves. The NRC is
also doing human rights monitoring related to refugees: for instance, in the
border area between Iraq and Turkey NRC monitored possible violations of
international refugee law. In another type of monitoring, NRC observers in
Hebron report human rights violations to the different paries.
Human rights monitoring also is part of the practical work of the organization.
Practical work can produce a spin-off effect on the human rights situation even
though it does not directly involve monitoring. Each situation has a general
mandate 'of operations, and the NRC defines its own operations within this
framework. To what ex tent human rights monitoring is done depends on the
mandate for the whole operation, and has thus a degree of ad hocism to it.
Human rights violations are reported to the contracting organization, not the
NRC. The NRC also keeps the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
continuously informed through letters and reports, but there is no formalized
reporting system. The procedures for reporting is given by the contracting
organization for each operation. However, the problems stated by NORDEM
on the lack of manuals is echoed by the NRC in their calls for the establishment
of uniform manuals and procedures in human rights work. According to the
NRC, reporting to UNHCR (the UN High Commssioner for Refugees) and
UNHCHR (the UN High Commssioner for Human Rights) is quite efficient
due to the existence of formalIzed manuals within these agencies. On the other
hand, the NRC doubts the usefulness of creating one manual for human rights
work, either for the NRC in particular or NGOs in general. There are numerous
different situations and a variety of mandates and conventions involved. The
NRC' s work is multifaceted, as is the work of many of the humanItarian
NGOs. How can one single manual then be established?
The NRC does not see itself as a specialized organization. Its generalist
orIentation makes it necessar to give its staff broad rather than specialist
training. The organization already has a basic training program, but to improve
the quality, the NRC is working to establish a set of mÏnimum standards for use
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in human rightsrelated work. The NRC sees human rights monitoring as a
rathernew activity, withfield operations on ly staring from 1992-93.
There are NGO networks seeking to develop procedures for human rights
reporting, this is e.g. an issue in International Council for V oluntary
Organizations (ICV A), an umbrella organization of NGOs where the NRC has
been very active. HumanItarian Liaison W orking Group, ICRC and UNHCR
have organized a joint conference on the co-operation with
UNHCR/ARINAC (the UNHCR mechanism for cooperation with NGOs).
The conference sought to formulate a handbook for human rights activities, but
the work was abandoned as it proved difficult to agree on the contents of a
common manuaL.
The NRC finds that a general problem of reporting is related to the varying
quality and availability of information, as well as the competence of monitors.
The main problems arise from the manipulation of information (by the
authorities and/or various interested groups). Reports to the NGO headquarter
from personneI in the field is important for the internal policy debate of the
organization. But the lack of reporting procedures creates little or no feedback
from the reports. Input does not necessarily lead to impact. The reporting must
be formulated and directed at the authorities in away that is likely to be
noticed. According to NRC, improved procedures for reporting would increase
the impact.
How "loud" the reporting should be depends on the parties involved, their
interests, and what they are wiling to accept. One dilemma relates to the
inadvertent and sometimes undesirable recognition which reporting confers on
the offending pary. In contemporary conflcts, one of the parties is likely to be
non-governmental. Reporting can accord a certain international recognition,
even though the reasons for reporting are fundamentally negative (cf. the Serbs
in Krajina).
The NRC is presently involved in a human rights project in Hebron, where the
paries have asked for Norway and other countries to monitor human rights and
report on violations. It is hard for NRC to judge whether it is the explicit
reporting, or the presence more generally, that has the effect of reducing the
level of violence. The NRC nevertheless finds that Hebron is the least violent
city in the area, and concludes that this is related to human rights
monitoring/presence. To assess the impact further, the NRC is about to star
evaluating the project.
The NRC sees its work on repatriating Vietnamese children without families as
another example of successful human rights monitoring. In this operation, NRC
guaranteed the safe return of these children. The operation involved a large
number of personneI, and reports were made on any violation of human rights.
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The project was partly human rights work and partly social work, and,
according to the NRC, was a hundred percent success story in that no violations
were recorded.
The NRC distinguishes between individually-oriented and system-oriented
human rights work. The ICRC is oriented toward the individual, whereas
Amnesty International is working toward the system. On this spectrum, the
NRC has adopted a pragmatie approach by adjusting its mandate to the needs
of each paricular situation. The organization points out that there is a certain
division of labor between the NGOs present in a conflet; not all of them need
to be reporting on the human rights situation. There is of ten an explicit or
implicit division of labor. For instance, one NGO can place itself in the most
vulnerable position by reporting "loudly" on human rights violations and thus
running the risk of being expelled by the national authorities or other paries to
the conflict. By keeping quiet, the remaining NGOs can remain to concentrate
their work on traditional humanitarian relief.
One general problem in NGO work, according to the NRC, is the frequent
discrepancy between the policy of the organization and the actions of local
workers. Individual workers may in effect end up representing themselves
rather than the policy of the organization. There are many examples of this
from the refugee camps in Goma (Zaire), for instance.
4. 1.3 Norwegian Church A/d (NCA)
The NCA does not include human rights rnonitoring as a major part of its
mandate, which it defines as humanitarian work. However, human rights,
conflct resolution and peace building are increasingly being incorporated as
dimensions of relief work.
The growth of interest in human rights work, which the NCA dates to the end
of the 1980s, is attributable to several causes. One is the type of conflcts
labelled "complex emergencies". NGOs working in these situations recognized
that human rights had to become an integrated part of traditional relief work.
These experiences are reflected in NCA policy documents from the early
1990s. The ending of the Cold War is also seen to have affected the traditional
views on humanitarian work by making it easier to address human rights
violations.
There is a changing perspective in relief work, from emphasizing basic needs to
emphasizing basic rights; this also applies to lang-term development work. The
growing emphasis on rights also has meant more awareness of the different
"generations" of human rights. The NCA has become more concerned with
political rights. The organization is planning a review of the different rights
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"generations" II order, toproduce "checklists" for what to do II various
situations.
For human rights monitoring and democratization work, the NCA co-operates
with NORDEM or the World Council of Churches. But the NCA does not have
routines, procedures, strategies or training on how to report on human rights
violations observed through conventional relief work. An example of NCA
reporting on human rights violations is Sudan, where the NCA worked actively
and overtly to produce,and present documentation on the human rights
situation. The NCA reports to the existing channeIs: authorities, other NGOs,
the UN, and the Norwegian MFA. Most often, the reports are not structured
and analyzed accounts, but based on anonymous descriptions.
The impact of reporting cannot easily be assessed. It is also raises complex
issues relating to organization roles. The NCA wants to follow a "transparent"
policy where humanitarian relIef is their main objective. On the other hand, the
NCA sees it as essential that national authorities are aware of the organization's
knowledge about the human rights sItuation. This creates a two-sided
relationship with the authorities of a country.
4.1.4 The Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
The NPA has entered an internal debate on the organization's role in matters of
human rights monitoring. Yet, it has already been involved in such activities in
Bosnia and in Guatemala. In Bosnia, the NP A reported on violations of
women's rights, particularly concerning rape. In Guatemala, the organization
reported to the archbishop' s seat, in Kurdistan to the Norwegian MF A. There
has been no systematie reporting from the organization however, and, like the
others the NP A, considers the lack of manuals to be a problem.
The effects of reporting is seen to var greatly. The NPA concludes that it did
have an effect on the issue of rape in Bosnia. The reporting helped create
attitudes condemning the use of rape. The NP A also notes how co-operation
among NGOs on reporting can enhance impact. In a situation where human
rights violations have been observed, the NGOs can agree on who is to speak
out loudly. The organization that reports mns the risk of being expelled by the
authorities, but the others can stay and continue their work. This strategy was
followed e.g. in Ethiopia. Ethiopian authorities were taking refugees from a
camp during nights. Two NGOs were present: one of them reported and had to
leave the country, the other stayed and continued the relÏef work. There is also
an element of danger involved in reporting, NP A cites Zaire and Tanzania as
examples of this. In refugee camps, the NP A most often works with UNHCR,
in which case UNHCR is responsible for reporting.
The NP A does not have much written evaluative material on its human rights
reporting.
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4. 1.5 Save theChildren (SC)
Save the Children is particularly concerned with children's situation and
children's rights in a conflct situation. The SC is working to establish this as
an issue: the organization wants to draw more attention to the fact that children
are among those most strongly affected by war or conflct. Greater respect for
children's rights wil have a positive impact at least on the consequences of
conflct.
The specialized focus of the se distinguishes the organization in the field of
humanitarian work. The organization's work is based on the UN Convention
on the Rights of Children. The SC works through national SC societies with
local personneL. Regular human rights monitoring would be difficult or
dangerous for the local personneL. Stil, international delegates are present in
many situations, and the SC is seen and treated as an international NGO
(INGO). These factors make human rights reporting possible despite the
dangers.
In Sri Lanka, for instance, the SC reported on human rights violations. Many
children lacked birth certificate as a result of the war, and thereby lost the right
to education etc. The authorities were informed of this problem, and measures
were undertaken to deal with it. In Ethiopia, the SC reported to the government
on the use of child soldiers, the offdal reactions to this were negative. The SC
has also reported on child abuse by UN soldiers in Mozambique (Ernst Schade,
1995. Experiences with regard to the United Nations peace-keeping forces in
Mozambique. Redd Barna Report, November 1995). In Bosnia-Herzegovina,
The OSCE Commissioner for human rights has suggested the establishment of
an agency to monitor children's rights. The agency wil be financed via OSCE
for the first five years, after that it wil be handed over to the Bosnian
federation. The Norwegian SC assists with expertise and material aid. Similar
projects in East and Central Europe are ca1led Children's Rights Centers and
may develop into an ombudsman function.
Save the Children Allance is developing manuals for field operations
regarding children's rights. However, the general lack of routines and
procedures in overall human rights work complicates this problems insofar as
children's rights work is sub-set of human rights activities generally.
The SC sees relief and human rights work are par of in a long-term process.
The organizations therefore follows a poHcy of not speaking out loudly in
human rights questions, as this may jeopardize continued. This applies e.g. to a
post-war reconstruction phase: The se is focusing on children's development.
The early post-w ar period is cruciaL. Children cannot wait, it is therefore
important not only to be present, but to increase assistance in this period.
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4. 1.6 Red Cross
The International Red Cross Federation does not have much experience with
man-made disasters. As a humanitarian organization it has to react to human
rights violations, but the dilemmas are identical with those of ICRC (see chap.
3). The Federation works on all sides of a conflet, and hence must maintain a
low profie in human rights questions. IFRC encourages other organizations to
report on violations. Those organizations who take side in a conflct are in a
better position to do so, according to IFC.
IFRC has been working on the Rwandan border since May 1994, with Hutus as
well as Tutsis. In this situation it is practically impossible to report on human
rights violations. In conflct, the different parties tend to simplify (black - white
thinking), this further complicates reporting on violations.
4. 1.7 Election monitoring
Of the Norwegian NGOs considered here, only NORDEM paricipates 10
election monitoring.
The monitoring has two main objectives: (i) to verify that the elections are
"free and fair", and (ii) to prevent violence and conflct during the election
proeess. With regard to the first objective, a general problem is the lack of
coherent manuals for the internatÏonal observers. In cooperation with the
Helsingfors Committee, NORDEM has prepared Its own manual which wil be
adjusted in accordance with the OSCE manual. Internationally, there is a
stronger focus on the need to coordinate manuals and methods, but NORDEM
has no influence on UN or OAS in that respect.
International election observation stared in the early 1980s and a more
. consistent framework has gradually evolved. Today, there is also a broad
international agreement on the need for uniform methods in this work.
However, the coordination remains rather poor in the field, this is considered a
problem by NORDEM. In election monitoring, the internationalobservers act
as one single body when reporting to the employer (e.g. UN). In addition, the
different national unIts produee their own reports which inc1ude matters not
mentioned in the main reports (e.g. criticisms). The national reports are
distributed to various national instances, e.g. the Norwegian MFA, and can
contribute to an ongoing national debate.
A potential problem, according to NORDEM, is that political motivations may
govern the decision to certify or reject an election result. This is particularly so
when political organizations are involved in election observation. The decision
whether or not to certify is based on several factors. "The good wil of the
people" may compensate for technical errors and problems (as for instanee in
Lithuania 1996). In such cases the positive impact of approval is considered
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more important for the further democratization of a country than a rejection
based on technical assessments. However, there is a need for coordination and
uniform procedures also with regard to this decision makng process. No
formal international evaluation of the result of election monitoring has so far
been undertaken, although some agencies have undertaken their own
assessments. NORDEM sees OSCE as having a strong interest in evaluating
and subsequently improving field operations in this area, and The European
Council and UN are less so.
Election observation also has preventive objective: to prevent violence, fraud
and other abuse of power during the elections. During the elections in South
Africa, Mozambique and El Salvador, for instance, the UN sent in large
numbers of internationalobservers because it was believed to have positive
impact on the situation. In NORDEM's view, the election monitoring has a
positive preventive impact. However, no systematie assessment has been
undertaken.
There is a growing recognition of the importanee and impact of such long-term
observation. Observers are present over a longer period of time, inc1uding the
electoral campaign. In this way, essential rights such as freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly etc. are also being promoted.
40108 Summing up
None of the five principal NGOs cited human rights monitoring as a main task.
Nevertheless, as "complex emergencies" have come to be viewed in the
international aid community generally as having a human rights component,
also the Norwegian humanitarial1 NGOs have moved in this direction. Most of
them now see human rights monitoring as an important extension of their
traditional mandate. For NORDEM, human rights monitoring is a principal
activity, paricularly election .
A general problem stated by all the actors is the lack of coherence in the field
of human rights work. How to report, on what cases, to whom, what impact etc.
Some of the organizations are preparing their own standardized manuals.
However, they all underlIne the problem of creating one common standardized
manual for human rights work, as there are several different human rights
conventions, and different mandates in different situations. The problem is also
acknowledged within the human rights movement generally, see Karen Kenny
(1996). Toward efJective training for field human rights tasks. Recommending
an on-going international proeess to codif best human rights ¡ield practice.
International Human Rights Trust (Commissioned by DF A, Ireland), and Paul
LaRose Edwards (1996) UN Human Rights Operations: Principles and
Practice in United Nations Field Operations. Ottawa: Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and Justiee Division).
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Another generally perceived problem is the too low quality of reporting and
training. This is partly attributed to the recent advent of human rights
monitoring.
The potential conflct between human rights monitoring and maintaining other
forms of humanItarian presence was noted. To reduce such conflcts, NGOs
have developed cooperative strategies based on division of labor.
The NGOs generally considered that human rights monitoring had a positive
impact, but noted that a) it was difficult to assess, and b) they lacked systematie
evaluations to make assessments.
4.2 Humanitarian presenee
4.2. 1 General views
All the humanitarian NGOs claim that presence generally has mitigative and
preventive effects on violence, if not the underlying sources of the conflct.
However, the only evidence cited in support of this claim was aneedotaL.
Systematic evaluations/assessments on the subject had not be u ndertaken , or
were not known to exist.
According to the NCA, the protectïve effect of humanitarian presence is
somewhat mythicaL. Yet the organizatïon maintains that the most efficient
protection does not stem from active reporting to external paries, but from
makng it clear within the conflct area that human rights violations are not
tolerated. The NCA sees a need to develop more conscious strategies for the
protection of civilans as a function of INGO presence. When the authorities or
the paries to the conflct limit the operational field of NGOs, the organizations
have to develop strategies to counteract these limitations. There is a need for
more active strategies also to communIcate visibilty. Presenee may limit
violence, for instance, if NGOs move their headquarers to an area where
violence is known to take place, or by simply being more visible. This can
easily be done for instance by driving cars marked with NGO emblems.
The NP A maintains that presence per se has an important preventive effect on
the level of violence and on the overall conflct. The presence of international
delegates, for instance, makes the Iocal employees feel safer. The NP A cites
Kurdistan is an example of this, where the presence of Norwegian relief
workers "guaranteed" the safety of local personnel who received threats from
the regime.
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The Norwegian Refugee Council is convinced that presence means prevention,
and exemplifies this by pointing to the presence of NGOs in Bosnia. The NRC
moved had 30 000 convoys of relIef materiel into Bosnia, and the organization
assumes that the visible presence this entailed did have a positive effect on the
level of violence. The NRC also emphasizes that presenee is a precondition for
reporting, and thus to achieve the preventive effects associated with reporting.
The NRC questions the relation between resources and impact, however, and
asks if a better, more formalized reporting necessarily leads to increased
impact.
The Norwegian Red Cross points to the experience of the ICRC, which
suggests numerous mitigative and preventive effects (see section 3).
Norwegian Save the Children beIIeves the presence of NGOs has several
positive preventive effects. However, these can be indirect as well as direct,
and are difficult to estimate. In Sri Lanka for instance, many local civilians
have been involved in SC work, and this has apparently been important for
their survivaL. Moreover, the presence of the SC in conflcts helps prevent the
recruitment of child soldiers. The general psychological effect on the civilian
population of international presence is also very important. ff the SC develops
into a strong international allance like the Red Cross movement, the impact of
their presence wil increase. At present, the alliance is working toward this
objective through better coordination of the alliance's relief work, stronger
alliance structure, etc.
The se recognizes possible negative effects of presence, such as the so-called
CNN-effect. This can be negative if NGOs use crises and tragedies in order to
sell their "product" - emergency aid. This question touches the ethical
dimension of relief work. SC has a code of conduct for all situations, but what
is needed is an ongoing debate on these issues. NSC also works through other
partners: ministries, other NGO etc. NSC has established a stand-by task force
(in co-operation with Swedish Se) that can be used to assist UNHCR in
complex emergencies.
4.2.2 Rellef assistance
All the humanitarian organizations noted that the level of consciousness
concerning the different effects of humanitarian aid is much higher than in it
was in the 1980s and before. Most respondents focused on food aid and other
forms of relief assistance when discussing the multiple and sometimes
contradictory effects of aid on the conflct and the beneficiar society(ies).Their
experiences differ, however, with respect to strategies that may reduce the
negative effects of relIef assistance, and the extent to which this is possible.
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The NP A experienced in Sudan in 1980s that food deliveries made the local
population waIt for aid in delivery areas instead of harvesting their crops. As a
result, the need for further deliveries was maintained and even increased. The
NP A believes that a similar situation is unlikely today, but notes that
emergency relIef can stil create passivity. This risk must be balanced against
the acute needs of the population in question. While humanItarIan aid and
supplies can prolong the conflct, lack of resources is of ten the main reason for
conflet, and food shortages can obviously lead to violence.
The Norwegian Red Cross points out that the Red Cross Movement offers
protection and medical assistance in conflicts. Protection is only for non-
combatants and soldiers hors de combat (wounded or deserters). Stil, there are
cases where soldiers have been fed and protected by humanitarian
organizations. In East Zaire, to mention only one example, it is well-known
that medical help and food deliveries have kept and soldiers and militia
members alive in the refugee camps. This has probably also happened
elsewhere.
The delivery of food in conflct sItuations has been criticized since some of it
wil go to the warring parties. But the armed parties wil get food anyhow, by
taking it from civilans etc. Food is aresource which can be exchanged for
other resources when food is scarce, e.g. sold to buy weapons. In the Somalia
famine in the early 1990s, food was handed out as ready-made meals in order
to reduce the stealing and trading of food. There are ways of separating
civilians from soldiers when handing out food, but in many situations it is
preferable to supply as much food as possible. Creating an abundance or
surplus of food wil reduce the potential for conflct, according the Norwegian
Red Cross.
The NPA also acknowledges that food supplies can end up feeding the soldiers
and thus prolong or increase the conflet, but has found that NGOs can do little
or nothing to disarm soldiers or militia-members in the camps. The armed
forces wil always get "their share". An informal objective is that no more than
one-third of the supplies should go to the armed forces, but there are cases
where they get/take virtually all. There are also cases where food aid turns up at
the local market even before the donor has finished distributing it.
Another potential negative function of emergency relief noted by the NPA
experience, is that creation of new economic structures that are kept alive
artificially through continuous deliveries, and thus underrnning traditional and
otherwise viable structures.
The Norwegian Refugee Council notes that there are possible negative effects
of humanitarian aid, but believes that the positive effects by far exceed the
negative. It is naive to exclude the possibilty that food deliverIes may prolong
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a conflct, but the humanitarian imperative is always more important. The
organizations should not stop bringing in deliveries to civilians even if it keeps
the warring parties going.
The NCA cites cases where humanitarian action has worsened the human rights
situation (Srebrenica). This may happen also in remote are as where food
deliveries attract large number of people, thereby increasing local tension
(Keren in Ethiopia).
4.2.3 Ne utra li y and impartiality
The organizations have found that humanitarian aid generally have political
consequences, but that policies of "impariality" - whIch most distinguish from
"neutrality" - stil are possible. Approaches to the impariality/neutrality
question differ, however.
In the NCA experience, humanitarian aid has had political consequences even
thought the NCA did not have specifically political objectives. In Ethiopia, for
instance, NCA aid helped people to take control of their own lives; this again
had political implications by contributing to the development of a civil society
which supported a political opposition. Hence, humanitarian action cannot be
neutral. However, neutrality is distinct from impariality, and the NCA strives
for impariality. For instance, cross border deliveries (e.g. in Ethiopia) do not
necessarily equal neutrality. NCA was not neutral in Ethiopia even though
working on both sides.
The Norwegian Save the Children regards itself as politically neutral. Stil, the
organization has found that its work inevitably has a political dimension even
though the main objective is to improve the lives of children. The se of ten
works on both sides of a conflct. In Sri Lanka, the se is probably considered a
pro-Taml organization even though it works on both sides. In Eritrea,
however, the se successfully avoiding the label "Eritrean solidarity
organization" .
The organization has found that there are ways of regulating/controllng the
political consequences of aid. In Sri Lanka, the se provided support to primary
schools, but withdrew aid when it was discovered that the schools were used
for propaganda purposes. Strong mechanisms for advice and support of
personneI is important, this includes training of staff, regular consultancies
with people coming in from elsewhere (national headquarers and
international), and written guidelines. The SC establishes local/national se
organizations and works through these.
The NPA's policy permits parialïty, inter aUa when this facilitates access to
certain areas. This is the case in Sudan, where the NP A does not co-operate
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withthe Sudanese government and therefore does not wait for its approval, as
do NGOs in Operation Lifeline Sudan. Generally, however, the NPA is
experience is that it is useful to co-operate as far as possible with national
governments and with the UN.
The Norwegian Refugee Council-linds that the current debate on neutrality in
the aid community is the same as in the 1960s and 1970s, but there is a need for
a new understanding of the question.
The NRC follows a policy of being neutral - i.e. politically non-partisan - in
relation to the conflcts where it operates. However, the different paries to a
conflct do not necessarily see the NRC as neutral, mainly because of NRC
reporting on the conflct. Moreover, the NRC has found that political neutrality
can only be intended, and not fully achieved, because presence in a conflct
necessarily carries a political dimension. "Impartiality" is thus a better word
than "neutrality". The NRC also points out that not takng sides on grounds of
"neutrality" does not always mean being neutral. Not seeing or hearing is not
neutrality, buts an indirect support of the stronger par.
In the NRC experience, it is important in such cases to report with reference to
conventions/agreements. For instance, the NRC reported that the Serbs were
ignoring the UN Convention on refugees in former Yugoslavia.
The Norwegian Red Cross points out that the long experience of the Red Cross
movement is based on the principle of neutrality (see section 3).
4.3 Confidence building
Some of the organizations are engaged in activities that can be grouped under
the general heading of confidenee building measures (inc1uding reconciliation
and negotiations related to a peace proeess), others find that their regular work
has confidence building effects. The organizations work at different levels
(state level, community level, individual level) , but all emphasize the
importance of the local leveL. Some have found indirect, low-profile projects
most useful; here groups work on concrete projects and "confidence" or
"reconcilation" appears as a positive side-effect.
The Norwegian Red Cross and the IFRC (The International Federation of the
Red Cross) are not actively involved in what might be called "confidence
building measures". V arious Red Cross activities, inc1uding those of the ICRC,
however, are considered to have confidence bu ilding and hence preventive
effects (see section 3).
To exert a preventive effect, the Re Movement has found it is essential to be
present at an early stage of a conflct, or even before a conflct stars. Early
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warning of potential areas of conflct or naturaldisasters requires institutional
networks. The national RC societies can serve this purpose, and are being
developed with local branches that cover the entire country.
The idea that local agencies wil have a stronger preventive effect emerged in
the 1990s. The establishment of local RC societies is a continuous task, and in
Africa goes back to the 1970s. Until the late 1980s, however, the IFRC
concentrated on strengthening the central agency of the national societies, and
hoped for a cascading effec;t downwards (local branches). As experience
showed that this was rare, institutional strategy shifted to focus on local
branches as well as national headquarers.
Similarly, both the ICRC and the IFRC have until recently worked mostly top -
down in human rights education. But renewed conflct in Liberia led staff to
question this approach. Increasingly, efforts are made to work locally in human
rights and tension reduction programs by educating locals, building on local,
traditional values, etc.
The NPA undertakes 10cal-Ieve1 confidence building activities in several places.
The NP A supports existing grass root movements as well as the establishment
of new local organizations. The organization has found that the most important
task is to build or rebuild confidence to "others" and to key social structures.
When supporting local organizations, the NP Aassists with expertise and
provides materiaL. It is seeks to create channels of contact between
organizations and the authorities. In Bosnia, the NP A has provided training and
seminars for women over a 3-tmee years period. In Kosovo, the NP A is
working with a group called the "post-pessimists". Young people from Serbia,
Kosovo and Bosnia come together to communicate and discuss war
experiences. This project aims at changing the concept of "the enemy" , and
thus contribute to sustain peace. The NP A has also helped establish a local
radio station in Bosnia.
While no systematic assessments of impact have been done, the general
conclusion in the NP A is that confidence building can work. For instance, in
Tuzla, the only remaining multicultural municipality in Bosnia, the presence of
NP A and the NCA and other international agencies is considered to have
enabled the population to resist ethnic cleansing.
In South Sudan, the NP Ahelps develop local community structures. In South
Africa, the NP A is working to change the structures that affect sodal violence
by provide education and human rights information. In Nicaragua and
Zimbabwe, the NPA is doing electoral training. In Rwanda, the NPA has a
project that provides on free legal advIce to returning refugees who have
problems recovering their property, and those who are dispossessed by
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retumees.' The NP A also works with R wandan authorities to restore the judicial
system.
The NCA has several confidence building activities, working on both the local
and national leveIs.
Two current "multicultural projects" are underway in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. A 3-year project for persons from the former Yugoslavia seeks to
educate "multicultural" opinion leaders from differentparts of former country.
In Rwanda, the project is aimed at women from different ethnic groups. The
women work together to find solutions to common problems. The project has
practical focus, but the process of problem-solving is expected to promote
communication between the different ethnic groups. A review of the project
conc1uded: (i) the project was most successful when building on already
existing groups, and (ii) problems experienced were related to insufficient
training and knowledge of personnei, as well as lack of clearly defined
objectives.
In 1995, the NCA was involved in the peace process in Mali. The civil war
created fear among the population, and popular meetings (aranged by the UN
and other international organizations) were designed to restore confidence. At
these meetings everybody except politicians was allowed to speak out. Various
problems were freely discussed and contacts were established. Fort Y meetings
were held and the general confidence generated was considered an important
reason for the subsequent restoration of norma1cy: markets started to function
again, economic activities generally were resumed, and a peace agreement was
reached, complete with a ceremony for burning of weapons. The NCA has
reviewed the case in a 1995 report Kåre Lode (ed.) Synthese du processus des
rencontres intercommunautaires du Nord du Mali. Stavanger:
Misjonshøgskolens forlag). The report concludes that the foundation for peace
was a bottom-up socio-political movement, with negotiation at a lower level
that the government
The NCA is also involved in peace building in Afghanistan. This work includes
support for local organizations, human rights training, and education in
international humanitarian law, democracy, reconcilation etc. In Guatemala,
Mali and the Sudan, the NCA was involved in the negotiations 10 promote a
national peace proeess.
The NCA is also Involved in psycho-social work and rehabiltation of war-
victims. In Mozambique the NCA works via local partners, one important
project is "Weapon for education". where child soldiers are given education. A
similar project is going on in Angola.
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The Norwegian Refugee Council is not involved in confidence building
measures at political leveIs, but works to bringing together people from
different sides of a conflct in various activities. Confidence building is
considered a positive spin-off effect, and not the main objective.
In AserbadjanlArmenia, the NRC has been involved in the process of bringing
the two pars together. Local capacity building is an important objective in any
project, this includes public administration, organizations and individual
capacities. In the NRC project, maximum two staff members are Norwegians,
the others are locals. The NRC has also tried to combine human rights
reporting and local capacity building in Africa. An example of this is the
establishment of an African stand-by force for disasters. In another form of
peace-and confidence building measures, the NRC has a human rights
education project in the Caucasus where the use of theater is one component
Save the Children is not involved in explicit reconcilation or confidence
building activities. The organization's experience is that this is an extremely
complex area of work. Reconciliation is seen as a private and personal matter,
and the SC finds that the work of the international community in this regard is
too mechanic. The staring point for many individuals or societies is a
reluctance to even speak about the war. If one moves into this area at all,
community workers must be carefully trained and be able to create confidence
at least to themselves as individuals Indirectly this may in turn lead to creating
confidenee toward others. Reconcilation works at a slow pace: direct
reconcilation work must be avoided, even the word "reconciliation" should not
be flagged.
In conflct areas, considerable aggression is generated towards the international
community, as local people feel they have been neglected. Relief work should
therefore have concrete foci were people working together to solve common
problems. This type of co-operation (as in Bosnia) may produee a spin-off
effects in terms of reconciliation.
Children's problems in the aftermath of war affect the entire society. In
Mozambique, the SC has been trying to identify the effect of war on children
through interviews in the communities. The answers do not focus on individual
experiences but on the changed relationships between generations. Children
take par in activities that used to be restricted to adults (e.g. young marriages).
Many children and youth paricipated in. the war. There is a high leve! of
distrust in the community; this is a general problem in a post-conflct period.
The impact of armed conflct on children has also been studied more
systematically, e.g. in a report prepared for the UN by the Mozambique-based
Gracia Machel Foundation. It also contains assessments, proposals and
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recommendations for future operations. (GA/511306. Promotion and protection
of the rights of children. Impact of armed conflict on children. August i 996).
The SC has been working to make reunification of families par of the relief
and rehabiltation response to conflcts. UNHCR has become involved, and the
situation has improved remarkably compared to the 1980s (e.g. through better
registration). The SC has found the practice of bu ilding institutions to care for
children to be counterproductive and damaging. Some NGOs nevertheless do
this, including SOS Chilqren's Vilages and churchorganizations. The SC
experience demonstrates that it is far more useful to paricipate in rebuilding a
social system and place presumed orphans in famlies.
Healing the scars of war on children is thus viewed as a par of a broader social
healing after conflct. In this area, expertise is more important than financial
resources. SC has found it critically important to build on local culture,
traditions and concepts (e.g. when is a child considered orphan, any important
rituals etc.). The SC role in so-called psychosocial work is not individually
oriented. The organization tries to establish general principles of work, as e.g.
in a working paper from the ISCA entitled Promoting psychosocial well being
among children affected by armed conflict and displacement.' principles and
approaches (WP no l, March 1996). The paper outlnes seven principles for
psychosocial work for children, these are:
1. Apply a long-term perspective that incorporates the psychosocial well-being
of children
2. Adopt a community-based approach that encourages self-help and builds on
local culture, realities and perceptions of child development
3. Promote normal farnly and everyday life sa as to reinforce a child's natural
resilienee
4. Focus on primar care and prevention of further harm in the healing of
children's psychological wounds
5. Provide support as well as training for personneI who care for children
6. Ensure c1arity on ethical issues in order to protect children
7. Advocate children's rights
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5 CONCLUSION
5.1 Principles
This brief review of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and
social conflct is based on principal sources in social science, reports of aid
agencies/organizations, and experiences of select NGOs. The review suggests
four major conclusions. All refer to humanitarian assistance in so-called
"complex emergencies" where aid actors operate in (or ne ar) a conflct area,
and violence is man-made but exacerbated by naturalconditions.
1. Humanitarian aid cannot be a substitute for political action. The current
conventional wisdom echoes the major findings of the Joint Evaluation of
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (1996). Humanitarian assistance has only a
limited, moderating influence on the political forces and the nature of violence
in the target area. The same applies to humanitarian presenee generally. Hence,
it is unrealistic and counterproductive to assign to humanitarian assistanee an
ambitious agenda in terms of mitigating existing violence or pre venting further
conflct. Not only does this raise false expectations, it may encourage political
passivity towards the conflct and its underlying causes.
2. Humanitarian assistance has manifold consequences in the conflict area:
negative as well as positive, unintended as well as intended. There is growing
awareness among humanitarian actors and independent observers that
humanitarian assistance has quite complex consequences in the target area.
There are significant short-term positive consequences (saving lives), but there
is increasing awareness of negative, unintended and indirect consequences such
as helping to prolong a conflct, enhancing the vulnerabilty of beneficiaries -
e.g. by attraeting people to feeding areas that become "kiner traps", as the
French-based Medicins Sans Frontieres describes the aid pattern in Ethiopia in
1984 (World in Crisis, 1997) - or by undermining 10cal coping and long-term
strategies. There is growing ariculation of the argument made by Wiliam
Shawcross in his study of Cambodia already in 1984 - The Quality of Mercy -
that the aid agencies have avested interest in channellng relief resources, and
hence become wiling paricipants in the institutional accommodation which
the North is fashion ing towards the repeated or permanent emergencies in the
South. In this view, elaborated by the British scholar Mark Duffield in The
Symphony of the Damned (1996), humanitarian aid becomes for the North a
principal mechanism of conflct management in the South.
3. A guiding principle of humanitarian assistance must therefore be minimalist
- " Do No Harm". The mounting awareness of the negative effects of
humanitarian assistance has been countered variously. One respons e is that aid
agencies operating in conflct are as should adopt the physician's motto "first do
no harm". Articulated in a 1989 book by US-based experts Mary Anderson and
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PeterWoodrow; Risingfromthe Ashes, the "do no harm" approach has become
increasingly accept by aid agencies and NGOs. The principle formed the point
of deparure for a major conference of North American-based NGOs and aid
agencies in 1996 that sought to develop concrete strategies of action (see
below).
4. Growing awareness of the complex consequences of humanitarian
assistance has sharpened the division between the "pure humanitarians" and
the "solidarity humanitarians" An old debate has intensified. The "age of
innocence" has passed as it is increasingly recognized that humanitarian
assistance necessarily have political consequences. However, the purists -
exemplified by the Swiss-based International Commttee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) - argue that the principle must be to provide neutral and imparial
assistance, and that ways can be devised to reduce the political consequences.
The "solidarity" view, on the other hand - increasingly exemplified by the MSF
- maintains that neutrality is a form of moral bankrptcy. Humanitarian
organizations must take sides in the struggle against injustice and inhumane
practices.
5.2 Practices
Humanitarian organizations have shown some reluctance to become involved
in explicit conflct management, as well as less direct forms of protection such
as human rights monitoring. The reluctant ones fear such activity may
jeopardize their presenee in a contlct area and hence their primary mission of
delivering aid. Nevertheless, as "complex emergencies" have come to be
viewed in the international aid community generally (especially in the UN
system) as having a human rights components, humanitarian NGOs
increasingly have moved in this direction as well. The major Norwegian NGOs
fall in this category.
Humanitarian NGOs that work in "war-torn societies" increasingly inc1ude
reconciliation or confidence building dimensions in their projects. Consciously
or not, these NGOs typically base their work on a sociological theory of
integrative cooperation which holds that by working together to achieve a
common alm, preferably a concrete task, the paries wil generate confidence
and mutual trust that transcend their conflcting interest. For many NGOs
involved in rehabiltation projects, this appear as a natural and relatively simple
extension of traditional activity. A prototype object is multi-ethnic brick-
making in Rwanda to rebuild house that were destroyed by ethnIc violence in
1994. Norwegian NGOs have adapted rapidly in this area.
HumanItarian NGOs that deliberate1y take on conflct management/resolution
tasks use three tools: i) handling of information (overtly or "quietly"), ii)
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providing good offices, iii) using the power of the resources which they
introduce into the conflict area to extract concessions from the conflcting
paries. The first two are most commonly used. As for (iii), given their positon
as providers of very significant resources in situations typified by extreme
scarcities, NGOs have in theory a significant bargain position. Humanitarian
imperatives limit, however, their wilingness to manipulate emergency aid for
political purposes. The major and partial success story in this respect is
Operation Lifeline Sudan, as recounted by a team for the Humanitarianism and
War Project of Brown University (USA) (Mine ar 1991).
Less dramatic ways to enhance the positive effects of NGO presence in terms
of mitigating existing violence, and preventing further confliet, have been
identified by US-based NGOs (US Institute ofPeace, 1996). These are:
. Closer dialogue with donors that have limited fieid knowledge so as to
avoid unrealistic restrictions and inappropriate mandates on NGOs;
. Improved planning to (i) assess needs more accurately, (ii) analyze the
consequences of agreements negotiated to gain access to needy populations
and obtain security for NGG personnei;
. Provide aid that wil have the longest term benefit to targeted groups and
empower local institutions;
. Deploy human rights monitors to help protect local populations from the
fighting factions;
. Coordinate c10sely with other aid organizations that operate in the same
conflct area;
. Contract for independent monitoring and evaluation of assistance programs
to reduce mismanagement and the diversion of supplies.
In a more targeted strategy, NGOs have identified at Ieast three ways of us ing
provision of resources in a conflct-preventive manner. ff conflct is a rational
choice in the context of shrinking resources, humanitarian aid can be used to
reshape opportunity structures in desired directions by
. providing alternative channels for conflct-oriented leaders, (ex-)soldiers
and miltia
. supporting moderating distributive institutions
. reducing re source scarcities in conflct areas
A traditional means of mitigating violence in a conflct area is to establish
protected areas. In its c1assic humanitarian form, these were Red Cross zones
(hospitals, etc.), protected only by a symbol and, implicitly, by the value of the
medical services provided to the paries to the conflct. Non-military protected
areas have developed in the 20th century to take many forms. Experience
shows that they are mostly effective when they
. are demiltarized
. serve the humanitarian needs of bothlall paries to the conflct
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. are established with the consent of the paries concerned
Protected areas of this kind serve to modify the symptoms of conflct in the
sense that they limit the extent of violence and reduce the suffering of victims.
As such they have a mitigating rather than preventive effect, and do not address
the underlying causes of the conflct.
5.3 The "state of the arts"
In the discussion of preventivemeasures '''.both in the social science literature
and among aid actors - there is considerable unc1arity about two critical issues:
What is to be prevented?
What are the limits of preventive action?
It is necessar to be c1ear about precisely what so-called preventive policies are
to prevent. The classic trade-off between peace and justice cannot always be
avoided. A policy designed to prevent "conflct" could easily disguise a policy
to preserve (an unjust) status quo, or to defend one social order at the co st of
another. Given different concepts of social order and rights - differences that
some observers claim are increasing in the 1990s (Huntington 1993) - these are
unavoidable implications of a preventive policy. To some extent, these
dilemmas are sidestepped by focusing on preventing violence as an instrument
of social change.
The logic of preventive action, moreover, suggests modest y of ambition. Social
science tells us quite a bit about why sodal contradietions sometimes develop
to produee violence. Recently, this has generated considerable writings on
"preventive diplomacy" as one powerful ar of preventive actïon (Lund 1996,
Rupesinghe 1993). Yet, as noted by Zolberg and Suhrke (1995, 1997)
knowledge of causes does not readily translate into policy. There are reasons of
scientific logic: most simply put, the complexity of social reality makes it
diffcult to antidpate the consequences of intervention. More fundamentally,
because any situation has roots in the past, preventive interventions constitute
in some measure attempts to remake history. This poses formidable challenges
for policy, and the par that humanitarian assistance can possibly play must be
adjusted accordingly.
As noted at the outset, the present literature on the mitigating and preventive
functions of humanitarian assistance is quite limited. The recorded institutional
memory of NGOs is fragmented. Part of the problem is methodological: in the
field of preventive measures, it is more difficult to assess failures than
successes, since we do not know precisely what was prevented if prevention
really worked. These probIerns are not insurmountable, however, as the
increasingly case-study based literature on of preventïve diplomacy
demonstrates (cpr. Jentleson 1997).
73
An important, step towards filing the present gaps in knowledge about the
impact of humanitarian action on social conflct would be to collect and
systematize the very considerable experience that the NGOs have accumulated.
In a very modest way, this review has started to do this with respect to the
major Norwegian NGOs.
It was beyond the capacity of this review to make a systematic survey of
evaluations/studies undertaken by, or for, the major international NGOs. To do
so, should be the next step. Secondly, systematie evaluation of NGO activities
in paricular conflct areas would yield critically important knowledge. The
work of humanitarian NGOs is increasingly being evaluated, but so far with
reference to criteria of efficiency or impact that do not include the impact on
the conflct in which the organizations are working, and the implications for
mitigating and preventing violence.
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Appendix Il: Terms of reference
Humanitarian presenee and the prevention and
mitigation of confliet: A "state of the arts" report
Revised version, November 1996
Chr. Michelsen Instiute
Summary
The proposed report wil fOCllS 'on 'the contribution of non-state actors, primarily
NGOs, to prevent or mitigate violent conflct by providing various forms of
humanitarian assistance and confidence-building measures. The report will
summarize and analyze the state of our current knowledge based on the literature, as
supplemented with interviews with principal actors. preparation of the report wil take
6 months, with completion date on January 31 1997. Researchers attached to the Chr.
Michelsen Institute wil carry out the work under the supervision of CMI senior
fellow Astri Suhrke.
Output
A "state of the ars" report (50-60 pages) wil present the main findings, identify
critical gaps in the literature, and where appropriate, indicate policy relevance. After
presentation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this report wil be published by CM!.
A summary report based on the main report (10-15 pages) wil be prepared especially
for the mini stry and relevant circles in the policy-makng and NGO community.
Proposal for follow-up activity in the form of additional report, seminars and research
etc. based on gaps in existing knowledge as identified in the main report.
Presentation of the report at a seminar in Oslo with the Ministry and NGOs.
Background
With the international community channellng very considerable assistance to so-
called complex humanitarian emergencies, there is increasing emphasis on preventive
diplomacy. The question is also asked how humanitarian assistance and other forms
of international civilan presence itself can contribute to prevent and mitigate conflct.
A small but significant literature has emerged in this area. Apart from the social
scientific work, there are internal reports and project documents prepared by NGOs or
international organizations. It is therefore useful at this point to systematize our
present knowledge in a state of the arts report that can be relevant to policy makers as
well as a guide for generating further lrowledge.
Scope and methodology
The report wil analyze four types of humanitarian or international civilan presence:
i) human rights monitoring;
ii) medical assistance (traditional Red Cross functions);
iii) "conventional" humanitarian assistance in emergencies (food, water, shelter); and
iv) confidence building measures (including "peace-building" measures, informal
mediation and contact facilitation).
For each of the four types, the study wil identify typical activities representing the
form of international civil presence, and if analytically meaningful the report wil
contain a revised typology based on activity/type of intervention.
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The report wil be based upon a selected number of examples from humanitarian
presence. For each of the cases, the key actor(s) wil be presented and a brief
description made of their role in the conflct, and the background of their intervention.
The key questions to be asked are: what do we know at this stage about how and why
such presence can help prevent and limit conflict? What are the conditions for failure,
or alternatively, of positive impact? Is success or failure explained primarily by the
function/capacity of the actor in question? by the situation? by the nature of the
activity pursued? by whatcombination of allfour factors?
ff the focus is on prevention, it is easier methodologically to study failures than
successes (since we can never know precisely what was prevented if prevention really
worked). Hence, most of the relevant literature for this report deals with failures of
preventive diplomacy, or efforts to mitigate and mediate in a conflct that is clearly
under way, or on the downswing. Among these, the report wil emphasize violent
conflcts of the kind usually called "complex humanitarian emergencies".
In this connection, it is important to recognize that since conflct is a process, so is
prevention. Preventive action can occur at several different phases and levels of the
conflct, both on the upswing of the cycle (where conflct in theory and up to a point
can get worse), and also on the downswing (where strife may be revived and start a
new cycle). The report wil therefore include studies of preventive activities through
the conflct cycle.
Similarly, there is no sharp distinction between. mitigation and prevention. reduction
of violence at one time and place has a preventive effect if it is reasonable to assume
that violence otherwise would have continued or worsened. Creation of pockets of
peace or "humanitarian zones" within a theater of conflct can have such effect, as can
use of assistance to negotiate strife. Humanitarian personneI may provide protection
simply through presence, as c,an human rights monitors deployed specifically for this
purpose. The same applies to confidence building measures that typically occur after a
conflct has erupted and in an effort to repair the situation. Consequently, knowledge
about such mechanisms for reducing violence wil be included in the report.
Where appropriate, knowledge relevant to Norwegian humanitarian assistance (by
type and geographic region) wil be given particular emphasis.
While significant, the relevant literature appears to be relatively small, scattered and
not easily accessible. We therefore decided to supplement the analysis of written
works with some interviews so as to identify key conclusions in the experience of
some principal actors as they themselves perceive it. We chose two kinds of actors: a)
the five principal Norwegian NGOs - because of their relevanee to Norwegian policy,
and b) NGOs engaged in peace- or confidence-building measures - because this is a
rather recent activity with a limited Iiterature.
Schedule of work and personnei
The work wil commence August 1, 1996 and be completed J anuary 31, 1997. The
research wil be carried out by
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Emery Brusset, a Ph.D. candidate at the London School of Econorncs who is writing
his dissertation thesis on the subject of aid in the prevention of conflct. Brusset has
previously worked with the UN and was par of the Rwanda-evaluation project where
he also worked with CM! researchers.
Gro Tjore, "hovedfagsstudent" in comparative politics at University of Bergen, and
attached to CM!, is writing her thesis on Norwegian refugee policy. She wil complete
her work in the fall of 1996.
Bente Hybertsen, "hovedfagsstudent" in comparative politics at University of Bergen,
and attached to CMI, is writing her thesis on emergency relief. She wil complete her
work in the fall of 1996.
Over-all guidance and final responsibilty for the report rests with Astri Suhrke,
Senior Fellow at CM!.
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